Idea Amendments of 1997 and the Private Schools Provision: Seeking Improved Special Education, but Serving Only a Select Few by Knox, Jennifer A.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 49 
Issue 1 Fall 1999 Article 12 
1999 
Idea Amendments of 1997 and the Private Schools Provision: 
Seeking Improved Special Education, but Serving Only a Select 
Few 
Jennifer A. Knox 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer A. Knox, Idea Amendments of 1997 and the Private Schools Provision: Seeking Improved Special 
Education, but Serving Only a Select Few, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 201 (2000). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol49/iss1/12 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE IDEA AMENDMENTS OF 1997 AND THE
PRIVATE SCHOOLS PROVISION: SEEKING
IMPROVED SPECIAL EDUCATION, BUT
SERVING ONLY A SELECT FEW
Jennifer A. Knox'
Public education derives from the societal purpose of educating "all
the children of all the people."' Yet, in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, public schools excluded children with disabilities. This ex-
clusion was due in part to the belief that disabled children's special needs
created anxiety for the teachers In later years, schools attempted to
placate parents and children by suggesting that segregation of disabled
children would reduce stress on the children themselves, when, in fact, it
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1. E. EDMUND REUTTER, JR. & ROBERT R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION 1 (1970); see also ARVAL A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
PUBLIC EDUCATION 38-39 (1989) (recognizing that all aspects of American society, in-
cluding economy, democracy, and national security, rely upon public schools to produce
strong, intelligent, and responsible citizens).
2. See Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 865 (Mass. 1893) (holding that a
child "weak in mind" and incapable of caring for himself physically could not succeed aca-
demically, and therefore could be expelled from the public school); MITCHELL L. YELL,
THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 54 (1998) (noting that courts validated the denial of
public education to disabled children even in the face of compulsory education laws). See
generally Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Parent's
Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 331, 343 & n.40 (1994)
(mentioning several state statutes that prohibited disabled children from attending public
schools); LaDonna L. Boeckman, Note, Bestowing the Key to Public Education: The Ef-
fects of Judicial Determinations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act on Dis-
abled and Nondisabled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 855, 860 (1998) (recognizing how so-
ciety preferred to ignore disabled students rather than enroll them in public schools or
train them in occupations).
3. See LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 11 (2d ed. 1995); see also
Timothy M. Huskey, Note, Teaching the Children "Appropriately:" Publicly Financed Pri-
vate Education Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 60 MO. L. REV. 167,
167 (1995) (explaining that funding a public educational program for a disabled student
often occurs at the expense of non-disabled children in the same classroom, who may not
reach their own potential due to the teacher's diverted attention). See generally Kotler,
supra note 2, at 344-45 (discussing public schools' tendencies to classify disruptive children
and racial and ethnic minorities as "special" because doing so eliminated troublemakers
and continued segregation, presumably also reducing teachers' stress).
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failed to garner such results.4 Entrepreneurs and parent associations thus
established private schools to educate disabled children.5 Public schools
funded private schools, considering it a way to meet their social respon-
sibility.6
Despite this arrangement, parents of the disabled still wanted their
children to learn with their non-disabled peers, so they joined forces to
secure public education rights for all disabled children. 7 As early as 1910,
public schools designed remedial programs for these children.8 The stu-
dents, however, were still segregated in special classes, and during the
1930s, their education declined considerably.9
The rights of disabled children received greater recognition in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. In Brown v. Board of Education,° the
United States Supreme Court determined that segregation of black
4. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 11 (stating that in the segregated schools dis-
abled students received some academic and manual training). Rothstein notes, however,
that this training was ineffective because teachers lost valuable class time trying to mini-
mize disruption of the instruction. See id. As a result of the lack of available education,
many disabled students did not attend school at all. See id.
5. See Frederick J. Weintraub, Nonpublic Schools and the Education of the Handi-
capped, in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
EIGHTIES 49, 50 (Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. ed., 1981) (discussing how parent associa-
tions established private schools for retarded children, with the hope that the public sys-
tem would eventually meet its responsibility and take over these schools). Many of the
private schools were so successful that they ended up competing with the public schools.
See id.
6. See id. (noting that the public education system did not wish to educate the dis-
abled but would not hesitate to fund their education in private schools).
7. See YELL, supra note 2, at 56 (suggesting that the ability of parents to achieve this
goal was due to greater social acceptance of the disabled as their needs became more rec-
ognized in the early twentieth century).
8. See id. at 56-57 (reporting that the White House Conference on Children in 1910
aided considerably in improving the treatment of disabled children). The conference
sparked remedial programs that encouraged society's interest in educating disabled chil-
dren in public settings. See id.; see also Boeckman, supra note 2, at 861 (explaining that
the slow migration to disability inclusion in the early twentieth century began with special
classes offered in the public schools to aid students with particular disabilities).
9. See Kotler, supra note 2, at 348 (noting that schools manipulated standardized
testing in order to segregate disruptive children and classify them as requiring special edu-
cation); Boeckman, supra note 2, at 861 (remarking that public schools established special
classes within the schools); see also YELL, supra note 2, at 56. Teachers believed segrega-
tion would foster self-esteem in disabled children because they would learn in less com-
petitive environments, and smaller class size would increase individual attention. See id.
This idea led to greater numbers of segregated classrooms. See id. The advent of the
Great Depression only worsened the prospects of public education for disabled children.
See id. As schools fought financial burdens to stay open, special education advocates
fought a losing battle to ensure appropriate instruction. See id.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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schoolchildren violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." This ruling had a profound impact on the rights of dis-
abled children; Brown's achievement of equal educational opportunities
for all schoolchildren was imputed to disabled children as well.12 Two
federal district court cases, Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania" and Mills v. Board of Education4 further paved the road
for equal education for the disabled by requiring all states to provide dis-
abled children with a free public education. 5
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act (EAHCA) after determining that the states were not providing
disabled children full opportunities for public education." Although
EAHCA has been hailed as the "single most important piece of federal
11. See id. at 493, 495 (holding that segregation of black students in separate schools
violated their right to equal protection and an equal educational opportunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at 12 (analyzing the Court's
conclusion that if black children were educated in separate but equal facilities, the segre-
gation was inherently unequal, because, otherwise, there would exist no reason to be edu-
cated separately).
12. See YELL, supra note 2, at 55 (stating that under Brown the constitutional right to
equal protection under the law applies to educational rights also, so education provided to
the public must be provided to all children); Boeckman, supra note 2, at 859 (calling
Brown's decision the "first giant step" toward inclusion of disabled children); Robert Ca-
perton Hannon, Special Project, Returning to the True Goal of the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act: Self-Sufficiency, 50 VAND. L. REV. 715, 718 (1997) (noting how
Brown's broad language covers children with mental disabilities); Christine Moyles Ko-
van, Disability Law, Issues in the Third Circuit, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1867, 1872 (1997) (at-
testing that Brown laid the foundation for parents' and educators' battles for inclusion of
disabled children in the public school system).
13. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
14. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
15. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876 (holding that students who were denied public edu-
cation due to their disabilities deserve the right to attend public school as part of due pro-
cess); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 297 (holding that a state
must provide a free public education to disabled students, as guided by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
16. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (Supp. III 1998)) (amended to be
the "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act"). Congress found a "lack of adequate
services within the public school system" for disabled children that was forcing families to
search for alternatives at a "great distance" from their homes and at considerable personal
expense. See Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(6)
(1988) (current version codified with some differences in language at 20 U.S.C. §
1400(c)(2)(E) (Supp. III 1998)). The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee rec-
ommended passage of EAHCA, finding that the nation upholds the idea that free and ap-
propriate public education and special education services are rights "guaranteed under the
Constitution." See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1433. The Committee urged Congress to take action and ensure that disabled children
receive an "equal educational opportunity." See id.
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education legislation enacted during the 1970s,"' 7 Congress proposed to
amend EAHCA in the late 1980s after findings showed that EAHCA's
programs were not fulfilling all of its educational goals. 8 Specifically, a
shortage of special education teachers forced public schools to hire fac-
ulty who did not meet school standards.19 Class size also increased, in
addition to teachers' workloads, which hindered teachers' abilities to
provide appropriate education. Moreover, Congress found that dis-
abled children were not being reached-few programs provided direct
services, and only small numbers of children received these services
through the aid of research and demonstration projects.2
As a solution to these problems, Congress amended EAHCA 1990 and
renamed it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
IDEA aims to improve early intervention, special education, and related
services provided to infants, toddlers, children, and youths with disabili-
ties.2' To this end, it endeavors to ensure an appropriate education for all
disabled students in the nation.24 It also strengthens parental involve-
17. John C. Pittenger & Peter Kuriloff, Educating the Handicapped: Reforming a
Radical Law, 66 PUB. INTEREST 72,72 (1982).
18. See S. REP. NO. 101-204, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: PUBLIC LAW 101-476 AS
AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 102-119 (1994) at 5 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
19. See id. (explaining that the teachers hired by public schools to fill special educa-
tion positions did not possess the recommended skills for teaching special education stu-
dents).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 2 (explaining that EAHCA authorized discretionary programs on a
regular basis, and that the purpose of the 1990 Amendments was to reauthorize more and
better developed programs).
22. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,
sec. 901, 104 Stat. 1141, 1141-42 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (Supp. III
1998)).
23. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(2) (Supp. III 1998); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
18, at 2. Other goals include greater emphasis on student performance, as well as greater
expectations of students, and implementation of different funding formulas. See YELL,
supra note 2, at 54.
24. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1998). IDEA accomplishes this goal by
providing every disabled student with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). See
infra note 40 (discussing the elements of FAPE). The Supreme Court's viewpoint con-
cerning FAPE is that it entitles disabled children to a "'basic floor of opportunity,"' but no
more than what is "reasonably calculated" to achieve an "educational benefit." See Board
of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201, 206-07 (1982) (holding that a hearing-impaired stu-
dent whose parents requested a sign language interpreter in the classroom was not entitled
to this service because the public school's provision of speech therapy and a hearing tutor
was reasonably calculated to achieve an educational benefit for the student). The Court
found that the student received an educational benefit because she passed kindergarten
and entered the first grade, and that this goal was all that the program required. See id. at
209-10 (quoting Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). Ac-
[Vol. 49:201
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ment in disabled children's education,2 facilitates access to information
about student assessments, and improves opportunities for children from
diverse backgrounds.6
As a method of remedying long-term neglect of the special needs of
disabled children, 27 IDEA includes a mainstreaming provision entitling
all disabled children to learn in a public school with their non-disabled
peers." Only children whose disabilities interfere with their opportunity
cording to one commentator, the educational benefit standard will not achieve favorable
results for either the public school or the student. See Tara L. Eyer, Comment, Greater
Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic Floor of Opportunity for
Children with Disabilities, 126 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1, 16 (1998) (suggesting that the 1997
Amendments are designed to achieve measurable goals of progress for the students).
Eyer believes "that the 'basic floor of opportunity' has been elevated from access to
meaningful progress." Id. at 17. Thus, courts today should raise the educational benefit
standard to one that will aid students in meeting and surpassing their schools' expecta-
tions, in addition to their own. See id. at 19.
25. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing parents' needs to un-
derstand their children's disabilities, to work with teachers, and to know legal information
concerning their children's education).
26. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,026, 55,028 (1997);
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 6-7 (mentioning that student assessments will
provide information about appropriate services for students). Student assessments are an
integral component of the individualized education program (the IEP), the written pro-
gram designed uniquely for each child, and planned by the parents, special education
teacher, general educational teacher, and agency representative. See 34 C.F.R. §§
300.340(a), 300.344(a) (1998); see also YELL, supra note 2, at 169 (describing the IEP as
the item that requires the public school to act in good faith to implement the necessary
related services, but warning that the IEP does not guarantee that the child will receive
those services). The IEP must be put into effect before the child receives the services; it is
reviewed annually. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.342(b)(1), 300.343(d).
27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (Supp. III 1998) (listing congressional findings that dis-
abled children are not receiving adequate, if any, education).
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(A) (Supp. III 1998). This provision mandates that each
state educational agency shall ensure that
[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including chil-
dren in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with
children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other
removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily.
Id. The 1997 Amendments refer to this provision as the "least restrictive environment"
provision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1998). The provision also requires
that the child be educated at the public school closest to his home. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.552(a)(3) (1998). The term "least restrictive environment" appears only in the 1997
Amendments, and it is not specifically defined. See Julie F. Mead, Expressions of Con-
gressional Intent: Examining the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, 127 Educ. L. Rep. (West)
511, 513, 516 (1998) (explaining that legislative history for the 1997 Amendments pre-
sumed that disabled children should be educated in public classrooms). In Oberti v. Board
of Educ., the court discerned this legislative intent, holding that a school district must jus-
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to learn in a public classroom are excluded. 9 Although this least restric-
tive environment preference intends to benefit disabled children, it may
not be appropriate for all disabled children, regardless of the severity of
their disabilities.3° Some parents believe that their children require more
individualized attention in a tailored setting.31 Others want their children
to attend parochial schools as a matter of religious choice."
Choosing private schools for their disabled children, however, poses
different problems for these parents. A major issue concerns possible
violations of the First Amendment Establishment Clause; placing chil-
dren in private parochial schools and expecting IDEA to provide special
education services may inadvertently result in the public funding of re-
ligious education.33 Another critical issue involves IDEA's stance on dis-
tify by a preponderance of the evidence its exclusion of a child from the public classroom
when the child could use supplementary aids and services to help him. See 995 F.2d 1204,
1217 (3d Cir. 1993). Another interpretation finds a constitutional basis for the least re-
strictive environment provision. See Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of
Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 611 (1995). Melvin believes that the
desegregation (imputed as "least restrictive environment") of disabled children is a liberty
interest vested in the child; an interest in avoiding the stigma of having special needs. See
id. at 611,617. Melvin applies the First Amendment right of freedom of association to this
concept, and notes that disabled children must receive due process protection under
IDEA. See id. at 617. He further explains Congress' intent in mainstreaming as a means
of showing non-disabled children that their disabled peers are non-threatening. See id.
29. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1998).
30. For some disabled children and their parents, religious considerations make pri-
vate education appropriate. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 4
(1993) (noting that parents of a deaf student chose to enroll their child in a Catholic high
school for religious purposes); see also Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050, 1052-53 (2nd Cir.
1996) (explaining that parents enrolled their mentally retarded daughter in Catholic
school so that she could attend the same school as her sisters, and implying that religion
motivated the parents' decision), vacated and remanded sub nom. Board of Educ. v.
Russman, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), rev'd, Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 220 (2nd
Cir. 1998); K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 81 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating that mother of disabled student attended parochial school with her daughter to
provide instructional aid because the school district denied the service at the parochial
school, which suggests that religious education influenced the choice of a private school),
affd, 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997).
31. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1433 (10th Cir. 1997)
(reasoning that parents enrolled their hearing-impaired son in private school because the
public school clustered deaf children, and they thought that a private setting would better
address his intellectual needs).
32. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4 (discussing the importance of religious values as factors
in choosing private schools); Russman, 85 F.3d at 1052 (same); Anderson, 81 F.3d at 676
(same).
33. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14 (determining whether a private school's provision
of IDEA services would create an excessive entanglement with religion and violate the
Establishment Clause). See generally Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Pri-
vate School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 37, 56 (1993). Green discusses the origin of "pri-
vate school choice," which hinges on the child benefit theory as the means of avoiding a
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abled children voluntarily enrolled in private schools by their parents, a
concern that EAHCA did not cover.34
In an attempt to decrease costs, Congress has recently narrowed this
provision further.35 The IDEA Amendments of 1997 state that public
schools do not have to provide special education and related services to
voluntarily enrolled private school children with disabilities," and even if
they do, these services need not be offered at the children's private
schools.3 7 Thus, IDEA often leaves parents with no alternative but to en-
constitutional violation for publicly funded parochial school programs. See id. at 54-57.
Under the child benefit theory, the true recipient of the funds is the child, not the school.
See id. at 56. Green believes that if only the children could be beneficiaries, then most aid,
including tuition payments and repair costs, would be denied to parochial schools. See id.
at 56-57. He recognizes, however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on the irrelevance
of the sectarian environment to the student's service in Zobrest, an interpretation that
supports the child benefit theory. See id. at 67.
34. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(A) (1994) (stating that disabled children enrolled in
private elementary and secondary schools may receive special education and related serv-
ices, and providing that children enrolled in private schools by the local educational
agency (LEA) should receive services at no cost, but failing to discuss services for volun-
tarily enrolled private school children).
35. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (Supp. III 1998).
36. See id.
37. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(II). The provision states that "services may be pro-
vided.., on the premises of private, including parochial, schools, to the extent consistent
with law." Id. (emphasis added); see also The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612(a)(10)(A)(i)(II), 111 Stat. 37, 62 (1997);
H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 91 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 89 (maintaining
that states have discretion to provide on-site services, and thus implying that children who
require a sign language interpreter in the classroom in order to learn their lessons now
may be denied that aid); 34 C.F.R. § 300.451(a) (1998) (requiring state educational and
local educational agencies to provide special education and related services to voluntarily
enrolled private school children with disabilities "[t]o the extent consistent with their
number and location in the State"). Scholarly interpretation of this provision is divided.
Compare Larry Bartlett, Post-Zobrest: Where are We on the Issue of Special Education
Programs and Services to Parent Placed Private School Students?, 108 Educ. L. Rep.
(West) 1039, 1062 (1996) with Kathryn Browning Hendrickson, The IDEA: Conferring
Rights on Disabled Children in Unilateral Private School Placements, 4 KY. CHILDREN'S
RTS. J. 1, 2 (1996). Professor Bartlett agrees with the statutory language that IDEA does
not "expressly require" related services to be provided on-site at private schools. See
Bartlett, supra, at 1053. Discussing IDEA in the context of religious education, he finds
that private school students need only receive "'a genuine opportunity for equitable par-
ticipation,"' and that IDEA does not mandate that such an equal participation be pro-
vided at the private school. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 76.651 (1995)). Bartlett also empha-
sizes that courts should defer to the Department of Education's (DOE's) interpretations
of IDEA. See Bartlett, supra, at 1055.
In direct contrast, Hendrickson argues that while DOE regulations seem to empower
the public schools with great discretion over which services to provide, a court must
"honor the clear meaning of a statute." Hendrickson, supra, at 3. Thus, she interprets
IDEA as clearly requiring LEAs to provide disabled children voluntarily placed in private
schools the same benefits as those offered to disabled children in public schools. See Hen-
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roll their children in a public school, knowing that the children will not
receive the education they need or the parents desire. Unfortunately,
failure to provide services at private schools forces parents to choose be-
tween a free, but perhaps inappropriate, public education, and a possibly
expensive, but most likely individualized, private education.
This Comment first describes IDEA prior to the Amendments and
IDEA pursuant to the Amendments, explaining Congress' motivations
for the Amendments, and detailing the legislative history of IDEA. This
Comment next examines three circuit court decisions vacated and re-
manded by the Supreme Court in light of the 1997 Amendments. This
Comment also analyzes Establishment Clause issues and IDEA's impli-
cations for parochial schools. Finally, it recommends a limited discretion
approach for considering the Amendments; an approach that should help
voluntarily-enrolled private school students who require special educa-
tion and related services without depleting the states' resources.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF IDEA
A. An Intent to Reform Special Education, but at theExpense of
Voluntarily-Enrolled Private School Students with Disabilities
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act (now the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act") in order
to provide disabled children the opportunity to learn in a regular class-
room with their non-disabled peers.39 IDEA requires that disabled stu-
dents receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE), as well as spe-
cial education and related services.4 Congress based IDEA on findings
drickson, supra, at 3.
38. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,
sec. 901, 104 Stat. 1141, 1141-42 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (Supp. III
1998)). Congress changed the name in order to update terminology; the change reflects
Congress' substitution of "disabled" for "handicapped" throughout the statute. See
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 40. Another interpretation finds that the new
terminology emphasizes the "individual" disabled person. See YELL, supra note 2, at 63.
39. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1998).
40. See id. § 1400(d)(1)(A). A "free appropriate public education" is provided at
public expense, meets the standards of the state educational agency, and offers an appro-
priate education in the specific state through an individualized education program de-
signed for each child. See id. § 1401(8). All disabled children between the ages of 3 and 21
residing within a state are entitled to FAPE. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). FAPE includes spe-
cial education and related services, namely support services, that also meet the above cri-
teria. See id. § 1401(8). "Related services" include
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services
(including speech-language pathology and audiology services, pyschological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic rec-
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that disabled children's educational needs have not been fully met." For
example, the findings state that more than one million children did not
receive the necessary services to give them an equal opportunity for edu-
cation, and that families had to send their disabled children outside of
the public school system at a distance and at their own expense in order
to find adequate services.
In order to motivate states to implement its provisions, IDEA grants
federal funds to all states that offer disabled children a FAPE.4 The spe-
cial education and related services included in FAPE are provided at
public expense, and must meet the standards of the state educational
agency." The local educational agency (LEA) works with the disabled
child's parents and teacher to form an individualized education program
(IEP) for each child.45
Parents who are dissatisfied with their disabled child's public education
and enroll their child in a private school may receive reimbursement for
tuition if a court or hearing officer determines that the public education
was inappropriate under IDEA 6.4  This standard stems from Congress'
reation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation coun-
seling, orientation and mobility services, and medical services, except that such
medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and
includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in chil-
dren.
Id. § 1401(22).
41. See id. § 1400(c)(2)(A). The findings also concluded that state and local educa-
tional agencies have responsibilities to provide all disabled children with an education, and
that the federal government has a "responsibility to provide an equal educational oppor-
tunity for all individuals." Id. § 1400(c)(7)(A). Congress proposed EAHCA to remedy
this situation. The statute includes a provision that requires states to establish procedural
safeguards to ensure that disabled children in private and public schools are educated with
non-disabled children as much as possible. See id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). This provision is
known as the "least restrictive environment" provision. See id.
42. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(E).
43. See id. § 1412(a). The essential elements of FAPE have not changed-special
education and related services that are provided at public expense, meet the standards of
the state and local educational agencies, and offer an appropriate education that conforms
to an individualized education program designed for each child. See id. § 1401(8).
44. See id. § 1401(8).
45. See id. § 1401 (11), (15); see also Dixie Snow Huefner, The Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 122 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1103, 1116-17
(1998) (stating that the definition of "parent" has been added to the Amendments, and
that a parent has the right to participate in the determination of his child's eligibility for
special education services, as well as serve on a placement team). The IEP must also in-
clude a statement of how the parents will be updated on their child's progress and yearly
goals. See id. at 1113.
46. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (Supp. III 1998). The provision does not men-
tion the factors necessary to determine inappropriateness. See id. It only specifies that in
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desire to reduce the amount of taxes paid for private school students'
education, thereby promoting free and appropriate public education.47
Yet, parents who voluntarily enroll their disabled children in private
schools rarely receive reimbursement.
order to receive reimbursement, the public school must fail to offer the FAPE "in a timely
manner" prior to the private school enrollment. See id. This means that the public school
failed to provide an appropriate education and the parents subsequently chose a private
school. See id.; see also School Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Department of Educ., 471
U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (holding that the Education of the Handicapped Act (EAHCA's
original title) allows reimbursement of private school expenses when such placement is
more appropriate to the child's education than a public school education). See generally
Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Remedies for a School District's Failure to Provide Services Under
IDEA, 112 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1, 7 (1996) (noting that parents may only be partially
reimbursed if the private school education greatly exceeds the requirements of an appro-
priate education).
47. See 143 CONG. REC. H2536 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Castle)
(supporting the Amendments by stating that they would reduce public school costs by
making it more difficult for parents to enroll their children in elite private schools at tax-
payers' expenses). This financial concern arises from the debate on whether IDEA is an
unfunded mandate. See id. at S4356 (statement of Sen. Gorton) (arguing that the IDEA is
an unfunded mandate, as the government only pays between seven and eight percent of
the statute's 1998 estimated 35 billion dollar expense). Counterbalancing this discussion is
Senator Harkin's belief that IDEA is not an unfunded mandate, but a constitutional one
that is implementing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
at S4361 (statement of Sen. Harkin). Senator Harkin maintains that it costs 14 percent
more to educate a disabled student in the public school than it does to educate a non-
disabled student, but that this is less expensive than placing the disabled student in an in-
stitution. See id. at S4361-62. Legal commentators have also broached the topic of the
IDEA as an unfunded mandate. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem of the
Unfunded Mandate, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 741, 760 (1997) (suggesting that as a statute
supported by strong constituencies of parents and educators, a fact that motivates states to
accept the decree, the IDEA obligates states to redirect education budgets in order to
provide FAPEs under a mandate only partially funded); Theresa M. Willard, Note, Eco-
nomics and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Influence of Funding For-
mulas on the Identification and Placement of Disabled Students, 31 IND. L. REV. 1167, 1181
(1998) (arguing that as each disabled child requires unique, tailored education, funding
formulas must be balanced against appropriate placement decisions for disabled students).
48. See Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 220 (2nd Cir. 1998) (referring to
facts set forth in Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2nd Cir. 1996)) (holding that public
schools need not pay for a consultant teacher and aide at a Catholic school even though
the student requires this aid to understand math and English); K.R. v. Anderson Commu-
nity Sch. Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that public schools are not
required to pay for an instructional aide at a parochial school, even though the student
needs the aide to help her learn the curriculum); Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch.
Bd., 117 F.3d. 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that public schools are not required to pay
for a sign language interpreter at a Catholic school even though the student cannot under-
stand his teacher without the interpreter). These cases suggest that if the parents were to
seek reimbursement, they would not be entitled to it because the public education was
found to be appropriate in each case. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222 (noting that the issue
concerned location, not appropriateness, but suggesting that the court's decision that
services need not be provided at a private school means that the student will receive an
appropriate education at the public school); Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019; Cefalu, 117 F.3d
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Most parents of disabled students want their children to receive in-
struction best suited to their children's needs, which may only be
achieved through individual attention at a private school.49 Parents also
have religious reasons for choosing private schools.5 ° IDEA, however,
restricts its FAPE requirement when considering voluntarily enrolled
private school students. 1 For parents who choose a private institution
despite the offer of FAPE, the public school system does not have to pay
the full cost of the disabled child's education. 2 The LEA must, never-
theless, make services available, in proportion to the number and loca-
tion of disabled children in the state who are enrolled in private schools. 3
Thus, public school systems do not have to pay for the cost of the child's
education, but they should incur the cost of special education services for
disabled private school students that are comparable in quality to the
same services given to disabled public school students. 4  The public
at 233. See generally Osborne, supra note 46, at 19 (commenting that the most common
relief for disputes involves a court ordering the school district to provide the appropriate
education or service).
49. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1433 (10th Cir. 1997) (ex-
plaining that a profoundly deaf student's parents enrolled him in a private school because
they felt that such a school would better meet his gifted intellectual capacity).
50. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (listing cases suggesting that religious
education motivated parents' decisions to choose private schools); Bryan M. Schwartz,
Survey, Education, Balancing the Interests of Schools, Students, and the Community, 75
DENV. U. L. REV. 801, 807 (1998) (mentioning a number of reasons why parents choose
private schools for their children, such as religious instruction).
One commentator observes that, although religious instruction is a worthwhile reason
for choosing a private school, parents need to realize that this right "does not extend to
any legal interest in public school funds for private education." Green, supra note 33, at
52. Green suggests that religious education cannot serve as the parents' argument for re-
ceipt of special education and related services. See id. at 52-53. He reiterates Chief Justice
Burger's words in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973), that denial of state
funds to private schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Green, supra
note 33, at 52. Green further says that even if religious choice advocates assert Free Exer-
cise claims, they, too, can be defeated because the federal government's refusal to fund
sectarian education does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See id. at 53. It
is "rational policy decisionmaking" for the Government to deny religious schools support
because limited financial resources and Establishment Clause concerns must be consid-
ered. See id.
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (Supp. III 1998). This private school provision
states that a local educational agency is not required to pay for the cost of education, in-
cluding special education and related services, if it offered a FAPE to the parents and the
parents elected instead to enroll their child in a private school. See id.
52. See id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a) (1998).
53. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i). This provision signals that states will receive
funds depending on how many disabled children are enrolled in private schools. See id. It
suggests that some states will receive less funds than others, but that all children should
receive some amount of services. See id.
54. See 34 C.F.R. § 76.654. This provision clarifies that "comparable in quality" does
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school must also grant disabled private school students a genuine oppor-
tunity for equitable participation in all programs.5 Consistent with the
law, services may be provided on-site at private schools, including paro-
chial schools. 6
B. The 1997 Amendments: Clarifying IDEA's Purpose
IDEA has encountered numerous judicial challenges because it does
not clarify whether the services are to be held in a public or private set-
ting, and to what extent the LEA must provide the services. 7 Congress
appears to have resolved this ambiguity with the IDEA Amendments of
1997.58 Specifically, the Amendments state that no LEA is required to
pay for the cost of education, including special education and related
not mean that private school students will receive the same services they would receive in
public schools, and that private school students may receive less services overall than pub-
lic school students. See § 76.654(c). Interpretations of the DOE Office of Special Pro-
grams (OSEP) reinforce this provision. See Bartlett, supra note 37, at 1057 (explaining
that OSEP interprets the provision not as providing an individual entitlement to services,
but only as affording the class of students as a whole an equitable opportunity for partici-
pation).
55. See 34 C.F.R. § 76.654(a)-(b). This provision mandates that public schools must
provide private school students with a genuine opportunity for equitable participation in
school programs, if they offer similar programs for public students in the same age group.
See § 76.654(b). The program benefits enjoyed by private school students must be "com-
parable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation" to the benefits enjoyed by
public school students. § 76.654(a).
56. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(II). This provision must satisfy the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment, which allows programs in religious settings as long
as they maintain a secular purpose, neither advance nor inhibit religion, and do not cause
an excessive government entanglement with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania and Rhode Is-
land statutes violated the Establishment Clause because they gave state aid to parochial
elementary and secondary schools. See id. at 606-07. Specifically, it ruled that both stat-
utes created "excessive entanglement[s]" with religion. See id. at 613-14. The Court found
that the nature of the state aid, which supplemented Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
teacher salaries and reimbursed the Pennsylvania schools for textbooks, created an im-
permissible relationship between government and religious institutions. See id. at 615.
Particularly, the Court determined that checking school financial records, which is neces-
sary to ascertain the amount of money spent on secular education versus religious activi-
ties, would directly involve the state in religious educational purposes. See id. at 620. It
also noted that state surveillance would be necessary to ensure maintenance of the
schools' secular purposes. See id. at 619.
57. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1433 (10th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the pre-Amendments IDEA does not clarify the extent of the LEA's obliga-
tion to provide services to voluntarily enrolled private school students). This question has
produced much litigation, which, in turn, prompted the passage of the Amendments. See
id, at 1434-35.
58. See The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (Supp. III
1998)). The Amendments became effective June 4, 1997. See id.
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services, if it offered FAPE to the disabled child and the parents chose to
place their disabled child in a private school. 9 Still, LEAs must allot a
proportionate amount of federal funds for special education and related
services for disabled children in private schools based on the number and
location of disabled students residing in their jurisdiction.4 LEAs need
not exceed this obligation; they are not required to utilize local and state
funding for special education and related services.61 LEAs may, but are
not required to, provide services "on the premises of private, including
parochial, schools, to the extent consistent with the law."62 This provision
is problematic, however, because LEAs must first decide if a disabled
student is entitled to federal funding before determining whether serv-
ices will be offered on-site.63 Essentially, the Amendments give public
schools the flexibility to decrease their IDEA funding so that they may
focus their education budget on other areas.6'
The Department of Education (DOE) has promulgated rules that
clarify the 1997 Amendments.65  The final rules state that no disabled
child who attends private school has an individual right to receive the
same services he would receive if he attended a public school.66 Accord-
ingly, the LEAs can determine which disabled children who are attend-
ing private school receive services, which services they are entitled to,
and how those services are delivered. 67 Although this discretion given to
the LEAs may cause them to decrease available services, Congress main-
59. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (Supp. 111998).
60. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I). These federal funds are mandatory, see id.
§ 1411(a)(1), provided that the state meets the eligibility requirements, see id. § 1412.
61. See Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1437 (explaining that states need only allot a proportion-
ate amount of their federal funds).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(II); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 91 (1997),
reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 89 (noting that the provision of on-site services is en-
tirely at the states' discretion).
63. See Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 221 n.1 (2nd Cir. 1998) (asserting
that unless a student is entitled to services, the determination of where the services will be
provided is a moot point).
64. See 143 CONG. REC. H2531 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Good-
ling). Congressman Goodling, the Amendments' sponsor, explains that the private school
provision gives states and schools the flexibility to "reduce their own IDEA funding lev-
els." Id. He describes this action as one "unprecedented in Federal law," suggesting that
this is the first time that states and schools have been able to choose IDEA funding at
their discretion. Id.
65. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 64 Fed.
Reg. 12,406, 12,444 (1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300) (listing the pertinent private
school regulations affected by the Amendments). The regulations were effective May 11,
1999. See id. at 12,406.
66. See id. at 12,445 (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.454(a)).
67. See id. (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.454(b)).
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tains that the federal funds will supplement local spending by the LEAs
so that disabled students' services will not be reduced.6
Another hope for disabled children enrolled in private schools is found
in the final DOE regulations, issued pursuant to the Amendments, which
include a provision that LEAs may provide greater funds than required,
if they so choose.69 As encouraging as this provision seems, special edu-
cation services previously provided to voluntarily enrolled private school
students will be severely limited, and in certain circumstances, will be re-
duced to no services at all.70
C. Judicial Perspective and the Amendments: Narrow Interpretations with
Little Room for Leeway
Case law prior to, and in the wake of, the 1997 Amendments illustrates
that courts have narrowly construed IDEA.71 Many pre-Amendments
68. See 143 CONG. REc. H2537 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Barrett).
But see 143 CONG. REC. S4356-57 (statement of Sen. Gorton) (arguing that the federal
government only funds between seven and eight percent of the IDEA to states, which
begs the question of where the states will procure the remainder of the cost).
69. See 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,410 (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.453).
70. See Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 220 (2nd Cir. 1998) (finding that
the state need not provide related services to a private school student, which suggests that
on-site services now will be limited in that jurisdiction); Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No.
259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437 n.5 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that IDEA "does not evidently
contemplate that some voluntarily placed private school students will receive no serv-
ices"); K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997) (de-
nying an on-site service to a private school student because IDEA does not require provi-
sion of such a service); Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir.
1997) (same).
71. See Foley v. Special Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 863, 864-65 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
public school does not have to provide occupational and physical therapy and language
services at a student's Catholic school because services cost more at the private school);
Russman, 150 F.3d at 220 (denying on-site help for a disabled child at a private school be-
cause the public school had fulfilled IDEA's requirements); Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1436 (10th
Cir. 1997) (deciding that although a school district must provide a sign language inter-
preter until the Amendments become effective, once the Amendments apply, the school
district has no further obligation to pay for the interpreter); Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019
(holding that the school board is not required to pay for an instructional assistant on-site
at a private school because IDEA imposes no obligation on the states to provide services
at a private school that are comparable to those provided at a public school); Cefalu, 117
F.3d. at 233 (holding that a public school need not pay for a sign language interpreter at a
Catholic school because all parties agreed that the public education provided was appro-
priate and satisfied IDEA); see also McNair v. Cardimone, 676 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (S.D.
Ohio 1987) (denying a disabled student transportation from her private school to a public
school for after-school services because this service is not required by the "nature of the []
handicap," but only for convenience); Work v. McKenzie, 661 F. Supp. 225, 229-30
(D.D.C. 1987) (holding that a disabled student enrolled in a private school does not re-
quire transportation to public school for services because then the Education of the
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cases ratify the statute's provision that LEAs need not pay for the cost of
private education, including related services, once a FAPE has been
awarded.72 The majority of post-Amendments cases also favor a strict in-
terpretation of IDEA.7 ' Thus, courts generally hold that public school
systems do not have to pay for the special education and related services
of voluntarily enrolled private school students with disabilities if the sys-
tem has offered a FAPE and the parents still have chosen to place the
child in a private institution.74
The Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have decided that the IDEAS 75
Amendments should be strictly applied. Three of these cases are par-
ticularly significant because the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
them in light of the 1997 Amendments. 7' Even though these cases sig-
naled a broad interpretation of IDEA in the lower courts, their outcomes
demonstrate that appeals courts are not extending the measure of the
IDEA.7 Moreover, these rulings show that the courts, in addition to the
legislatures, are determining who will receive services and who will be
78
denied services. Thus, certain disabled children who require services
necessary to their learning will not receive an appropriate education.
1. Russman v. Board of Education: Without Entitlement, Location of
Services Makes No Difference
In Russman v. Board of Education, the Second Circuit held that the
IDEA Amendments do not require states to provide a consultant teacher
Handicapped Act would have no limits).
72. See McNair, 676 F. Supp. at 1363; Work, 661 F. Supp. at 229.
73. See Foley, 153 F.3d at 863; Russman, 150 F.3d at 221-22; Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1436-
37; Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019; Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 232-33.
74. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 221-22; Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1433; Anderson, 125 F.3d at
1019; Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 233.
75. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 221-22 (Second Circuit); Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019
(Seventh Circuit); Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1433 (Tenth Circuit).
76. See Board of Educ. v. Russman, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.); Fowler v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 259, 521 U.S. 1115 (1997) (mem.); K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp.,
521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.). Cefalu was also remanded for consideration per the
Amendments, not by the Supreme Court, but by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 103 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997).
77. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222 (construing the Amendments to be the final word
on the student's situation); Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1438 (suggesting that the student's parents
will receive a lesser reimbursement for services once the Amendments apply to the stu-
dent's situation); Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019 (explaining that the Amendments clearly
show that public schools need not ensure that private school students receive federally
funded services comparable to services provided to public school students).
78. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222 (determining that the student is not entitled to a
consultant teacher, and that even if she were, she would not receive this service because it
is provided at the state's discretion).
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and teacher's aide to a disabled student at the student's Catholic school.79
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the student's parents,8° but, on certiorari, the Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded the case for consideration per the
Amendments. 8' The appeals court subsequently reversed its original
opinion, finding the school district's argument that IDEA does not re-
quire public schools to provide on-site services to voluntarily enrolled
private school students with disabilities unconvincing.82 The statute, ac-
cording to the court, is silent as to the location of services. 83 Neverthe-
less, the court employed legislative history to determine that the state has
the discretion to provide on-site services. Applying this reasoning, the
court held that the state need not provide the disabled student with a
consultant teacher and aide at her parochial school.
2. K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp.: The Amendments Are
the Final Word
In K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp., the Seventh Circuit
considered the entitlement issue.86 Reversing the district court's holding
that a school district must provide full-time instructional services on-site
to a private parochial school student with severe disabilities, 7 the court
of appeals determined that pre-Amendments IDEA did not entitle the
student to the same services as public school students. 8 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and vacated and remanded the case for consid-
eration in light of the Amendments.89 The appeals court affirmed its
prior holding and maintained its interpretation of IDEA, declaring that
79. See id.
80. See Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050,1052, 1057 (2nd Cir. 1996).
81. See Russman v. Board of Educ., 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.).
82. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222.
83. See id. (reasoning that LEAs are required to spend a proportionate amount of
federal funds for voluntarily enrolled private school children, but observing that IDEA
never mentions where the services must be provided).
84. See id. (finding that IDEA mandates states to provide services at private schools
"'to the extent consistent with law, at State's discretion"') (emphasis added). Thus, the
court concluded, states need not provide services on-site if they choose not to do so. See
id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 91 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 89.
85. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222.
86. 81 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1996).
87. See K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (S.D. Ind.
1995), rev'd 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 521 U.S. 1114
(1997) (mem.), on remand 125 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 1997).
88. See Anderson, 81 F.3d at 678, 680.
89. See Anderson, 521 U.S. at 1114.
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the Amendments do not require the school district to provide the student
with an instructional aide in her parochial school.90
The court decided that the Amendments show that LEAs are not re-
quired to spend their own funds to ensure that the special education
services of voluntarily enrolled private school children with disabilities
are "'comparable"' to those of public school children with disabilities.91
Furthermore, the court stated that, if inconsistent, any of the parents' ar-
guments based on DOE regulations must be regarded as superseded by
the Amendments.92
The unequivocal decisions in Russman and Anderson illustrate that
voluntarily enrolled disabled private school children will not receive spe-
cial education and services in the Second and Seventh circuits unless
their school districts choose not to align with the Amendments.93 The
districts, however, may operate at their own discretion, pursuant to the
Amendments. As public schools favor a decrease in local spending,95 it
seems unlikely that the courts or the schools will revise their restrictive
approach toward voluntarily enrolled private school students.
3. Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259: A Different Approach to
the Amendments Suggests Some Leniency
The Tenth Circuit adopts a different position than Russman and An-
derson, interpreting the IDEA as prospective rather than retroactive.
96
90. See Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019 (finding that all parties, including the student, the
school corporation, and the United States, agreed that the Amendments do not "impugn"
the appeals court's holding).
91. See id. (quoting Congress' explanation of this section of IDEA and determining
that this "legislative clarification" required a reversal of the district court's holding that
had required the school district to pay for the student's instructional aide at her Catholic
school).
92. See id. (noting that DOE is preparing new regulations that will reflect the provi-
sions of the Amendments).
93. See Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 222 (2nd Cir. 1998); Anderson, 125
F.3d at 1019.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 91 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 89 (in-
terpreting the Amendments as granting states the discretion to require the provision of
on-site related services at private or parochial schools); see also Russman, 150 F.3d at 222;
Anderson 125 F.3d at 1019 (considering legislative history in determining that related
services need not be provided on-site).
95. See 143 CONG. REC. H2537 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Barrett)
(explaining that schools will cut back on special education funding once federal appropria-
tions reach $4.1 billion); see also Tobin P. Richer, County of San Diego v. California Spe-
cial Education Hearing Office: A Misapplication and Drastic Expansion of IDEA Cover-
age, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 2 (1997) (recognizing that school districts desire a restricted
interpretation of the IDEA due to their budgetary concerns).
96. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1997) (ex-
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This view offers a glimmer of hope for parents who want their children to
receive special education services in private schools. In Fowler v. Unified
School District No. 259,97 a student's parents filed an action to compel
their son's school district to provide him with a sign language interpreter
at his private school.9' Although the district court granted an injunction
in favor of the parents,99 the court of appeals reversed, concluding that
the school district must pay only partially for the interpreter's services. 100
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but, as in Russman and Anderson,
later vacated and remanded the case in the wake of the Amendments. 10'
On remand, the court of appeals held that the prior IDEA provision
was applicable until the Amendments' effective date, June 4, 1997, but
that the case would be remanded to the district court to determine pay-
ment of services after June 4, 1997.12 The court adhered to its previous
interpretation that pre-Amendments IDEA requires that the public
school pay for a private school interpreter as long as the cost would not
exceed the average cost of a public school interpreter. 3 The court also
plaining that courts in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits construed the Amendments as pro-
spective, and that "[tihe Amendments nowhere state that they apply retroactively").
Fowler quotes the Supreme Court's assertion that the "'presumption against retroactive
legislation' 'is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence."' Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1435 (quoting
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997)). The Supreme Court's
assertion, as the Fowler court notes, appeared prior to Hughes in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). See Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1435. In Landgraf, the Supreme
Court held that a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 creating a right to recover com-
pensation and punitive damages for intentional discrimination, as well as a right to a jury
trial, does not apply to a Civil Rights Act Title VII case pending appeal when the 1991
statute was enacted because the statutory language contains no "explicit retroactivity pro-
visions." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 262. "Retroactive law" is defined as law "which take[s]
away or impair[s] vested rights acquired under existing laws, create[s] new obligations, im-
pose[s] a new duty, or attach[es] a new disability in respect to the transactions or consid-
erations already past." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990). "The presump-
tion against retroactive legislation" is founded upon "[e]lementary considerations of
fairness dictat[ing] that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is
and to conform their conduct accordingly." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. Thus, the Fowler
court interprets the Amendments as divesting parents and children of on-site services only
after the legislation becomes effective. See Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1436.
97. 128 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1997).
98. See id. at 1433. The parents felt that a private nonsectarian school could provide
best for their son's intellectual gifts, and asked that a sign language interpreter be pro-
vided on-site. See id.
99. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 900 F. Supp. 1540, 1546 (D. Kan. 1995).
100. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 107 F.3d 797, 808, 810 (10th Cir. 1997).
101. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 521 U.S. 1115 (1997) (mem.).
102. See Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1436-40 (noting that the Amendments do not require
states to spend any funds beyond their federal obligation, but also stating that the IDEA is
prospective only, and so the Amendments will not apply to the student until June 4, 1997).
103. See id. at 1436. In support of its position, the court cites Amos v. Maryland De-
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noted that the prior regulations left unclear the amount of services avail-
able to voluntarily enrolled private school students with disabilities,1°4
and affirmed that the Amendments have clarified that states are not ob-
ligated to use their own state funds for provision of such services.' 5 It
recognized, too, that the Amendments may leave some disabled students
without federal funding; moreover, IDEA "does not evidently contem-
plate that some voluntarily placed private school students [with disabili-
ties] will receive no services."'O Although Fowler suggests that the
school district will not need to pay for the disabled student's services af-
ter the Amendments' effective date, its recognition of IDEA's possible
harmful effects heightens concern that the Amendments may ultimately
deny more disabled children necessary services than the previous regula-
tions."
D. Establishment Clause Cases: Parochial Students Can Receive On-Site
Services
There is concern that implementation of a federal program such as
IDEA in a parochial school may directly or indirectly affect a service
provider's religious values.'° The Establishment Clause provides that
the federal government cannot favor or disfavor religion or encourage
participation or denial of religion.' 9 Although the Supreme Court has
yet to decide an IDEA case involving the issue of payment of services, it
determined in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District that receipt of
such services does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
partment of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 126 F.3d 589, 603 n.8 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Amos court held that a subsequent amendment "in no way undermines the reasoning
of [a prior case]" when the court is analyzing the ambiguity of IDEA. Id.
104. See Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1434 (noting that DOE's regulations do not explain states'
obligations to make special education services available to students).
105. See id. at 1437 (stating that only federal funds are necessary).
106. Id. at 1437 n.5 (explaining that DOE's proposed regulations grant LEAs discre-
tion to determine which disabled children receive which services, and this power may re-
sult in some children receiving no services at all).
107. See id.
108. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (explaining that
the court of appeals employed the Lemon factors to find that providing a sign language
interpreter at a sectarian high school constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause).
The Lemon factors are whether the program has a secular purpose, neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and does not create an excessive government entanglement with religion.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
109. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at
612-13 (applying a three-prong test to determine Establishment Clause violations).
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Amendment.11°
1. Zobrest: Interpreter Services neither Aid nor Harm Religious Values
In Zobrest, an Arizona school district refused to provide a student with
a sign language interpreter at his sectarian high school because it be-
lieved that doing so was unconstitutional. 1' The student's parents sought
injunctive relief against the district.1 2 The Ninth Circuit held that provi-
sion of a sign language interpreter would advance religion, thereby
causing an unconstitutional entanglement between church and state.
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court found that no viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause existed.14 Chief Justice Rehnquist rea-
soned that IDEA provides services in a neutral manner without regard to
the religious or nonpublic nature of the school. The statute allows par-
ents the choice of schools; thus, the interpreter's presence results from a
private decision. 6 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
110. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-11 (relying on the "child benefit" theory to determine
that the disabled child, not the religious school, was benefiting from the interpreter serv-
ices, and thus, the instruction did not add or subtract from the religious environment).
Zobrest has been cited as creating "'fresh law"' concerning judicial interpretation of gov-
ernmental ties to religion. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997); see also Mar-
tha M. McCarthy, The Road to Agostini and Beyond, 124 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 771, 778
(1998) (analyzing Zobrest's impact on Agostini). Zobrest represents a departure from the
Court's previous rulings on Establishment Clause violations in parochial schools, in which
it adhered to a strict division between church and state. See McCarthy, supra, at 772-74
(referencing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985), and Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), in which the Court ruled
consistently that public school instruction on parochial school grounds violated the Estab-
lishment Clause).
111. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
112. See id. at 4-5.
113. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1992).
114. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8 (explaining that "government programs that neutrally
provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion" do not
violate the Establishment Clause merely because religious schools may gain an "attenu-
ated financial benefit"). In support of this position, the Court cited Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983), which held that a Minnesota law allowing tax deductions of certain educa-
tional expenses did not violate the clause, even though most of the deductions went to
parents of parochial schools students. See id. at 8-9.
115. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986). The Court in Witters held that Washington State's aid
to a blind person studying at a private Christian school did not violate the Establishment
Clause. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 489. The program did not create a financial benefit to the
student, and it was made available without regard to the nature of the institution. See id.
at 487 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
782-83 n.38 (1973)).
116. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (noting that it is the parents' personal decision to re-
quest an interpreter at a private school); Hugh Baxter, Managing Legal Change: The
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when parents choose a sectarian school there is no financial benefit to
that school because the school's gain is secondary to the child's benefit. 7
The Chief Justice also added that the interpreter will neither benefit nor
harm the religious environment 8
Although the majority held that the student should receive an inter-
preter, it did not discuss IDEA requirements of payment for voluntary
parental placement.11 9 The dissent, however, addressed this issue by as-
serting that the majority's decision bypassed IDEA's provision that the
furnishing of special education and related services at a private school is
not mandatory as long as the services are made available at a public
school.2 This contention indicates that the entitlement issue is regarded
as an auxiliary issue to the Establishment Clause concern. It appears
121that the Zobrest Court merely chose not to consider this issue. l 2
Transformation of Establishment Clause Law, 46 UCLA L. REV. 343, 381 (1998) (sug-
gesting that the Court's emphasis on private decision making could open up the flood
gates, rendering any aid constitutionally valid as long as a private decision is involved);
Green, supra note 33, at 49 (explaining that the Court sometimes allows public aid in re-
ligious schools for "'ideologically neutral"' activities).
117. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12-13 (asserting that the purpose of IDEA is not to sup-
port nonpublic, religious schools) (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 488)).
118. See id. at 13.
119. See id. The majority did not discuss the entitlement issue because the parties did
not press the federal statutory claim. See id. at 16.
120. See id. at 15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun refers to a number of
circuit court cases that have led to the same conclusion. See id.
121. See id. at 16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for reaching a con-
stitutional question in a case that could be decided instead on the entitlement issue, al-
though the parties did not raise it). The majority's decision not to consider the entitlement
issue has been the subject of significant negative commentary. See Ralph D. Mawdsley,
On-Site IDEA Services at Private Schools: The Emergence of Multiple Judicial Standards,
121 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 445, 446 (1998) (explaining that the majority's decision "virtually
assured" future litigation, litigation which has resulted in a "confusing and discordant in-
terpretation" of the requirement to provide on-site services). See generally Devora L.
Lindeman, Comment, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: Private Choices and
Public Funding Under the Establishment Clause, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 896-98 (1995)
(arguing that, had the majority considered the IDEA issues, the IDEA would have pre-
cluded any discussion of Establishment Clause violations because the statute prevented
the interpreter from providing services at a private parochial school). Ms. Lindeman also
contends that the service of a sign language interpreter involves a federally funded func-
tion in the communication of religious messages, which in itself advances religion, and thus
is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. See id. at 897-98. She contends that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's child benefit theory cannot conceal the interpreter's indoctrina-
tion of religious values. See id. at 892.
122. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 7-8 (announcing that the majority did not consider the
entitlement issue because it was not raised in the court of appeals, and "'[w]here issues are
neither raised before nor considered by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not ordinar-
ily consider them."' (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970))).
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2. Agostini v. Felton: A Recent View of the Establishment Clause's
Effect upon Schools
Zobrest is not the only Supreme Court case that focuses on the tension
between the Establishment Clause and parochial schools. Although not
an IDEA case, Agostini v. Felton 12 sheds some light on the issue of fed-
erally funded programs' roles in religious institutions. In Agostini, the
Supreme Court held that New York City teachers could provide reme-
dial instruction in parochial schools.124 The Court employed the oft cited
Lemon test,'2 which utilizes three prongs in deciding whether an Estab-
lishment Clause violation exists.126 The test requires that the statute have
a secular purpose; its principal or primary effect cannot be one that ad-
vances or inhibits religion; and it cannot create an excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion.17 Applying this test, the Agos-
tini Court decided that federally funded programs, such as the one at
issue, do not violate the Establishment Clause as long as the instruction
enhances, but does not replace, regularly provided services; the funding
is neutral; and the program ensures that the instruction is secular.'2
3. Peck v. Lansing School District. The Sixth Circuit Sweetens the
Lemon Criteria for Related Services in Parochial Schools
Agostini's holding paved the road to victory for a young student in
Peck v. Lansing School District,"" a case in which the school district de-
nied physical and occupational therapy services to the student, who at-
tended parochial school1 O Applying Agostini and Zobrest, the district
123. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
124. See id. at 234-35 (concluding that federally funded remedial instruction in paro-
chial schools does not violate the Establishment Clause when such instruction adheres to
safeguards imposed by the Clause). The remedial instruction did not advance government
inculcation, create an excessive entanglement, nor have other than a secular purpose. See
id. at 234.
125. See id.; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Sixth Cir-
cuit has noted that the Agostini Court used the Lemon factors by incorporating the entan-
glement factor into the effects calculus factor, which determines whether the program ad-
vances or inhibits religion. See Peck v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 148 F.3d 619,628 (6th Cir. 1998)
(citing Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010, 2016 (1997)). Likewise, the Sixth Circuit
observed that the Agostini Court used the first prong of the Lemon test to find whether
the program has a secular purpose and a primary effect other than to advance religion.
See id. at 628.
126. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (noting that these prongs have developed throughout
the Court's history of interpreting the Establishment Clause).
127. See id. at 612-13.
128. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-35.
129. See Peck, 148 F.3d at 628.
130. See id. at 622.
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court granted summary judgment for the student, finding that the provi-
sion of the services at the student's Lutheran school did not cause an ex-
cessive entanglement between government and religion."' The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that Agostini governs and that IDEA fulfills all
three prongs of the Lemon test.' 32
In support of their position, the student's parents based their reasoning
on pre-Amendments IDEA, arguing that IDEA required that services to
voluntarily enrolled private school students be comparable to those of-
fered to public school students.33 Conversely, the school district asserted
that the student would receive a FAPE if her services were provided off-
site. T3 Regardless of these arguments, the court did not consider the case
in terms of the Amendments.
Though Zobrest and Peck demonstrate that the Establishment Clause
does not bar receipt of special education and related services in parochial
schools, they suggest that, if the Amendments were taken into considera-
tion, the students would be denied the services,' 3 thereby substantially
altering Zobrest's ruling.13' Although Zobrest would not be overturned, it
would become moot under the Amendments because the students would
not receive the sign language interpreter services."8 Thus, the Estab-
lishment Clause would be only a secondary factor, or perhaps not even
one at all, in future IDEA litigation.
131. See id. at 624 (explaining that the Lutheran school would be responsible for
transporting the student to the school library for therapy, so that public school employees
need not enter her classroom).
132. See id. at 628-29 (recognizing that Agostini is now precedent, and its determina-
tion that remedial instruction in parochial schools does not violate the Establishment
Clause applies as well to IDEA and this case).
133. See id. at 622.
134. See id. at 623.
135. See id. at 626 & n.8 (expressing an opinion concerning the student's entitlement
to services per the Amendments).
136. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 15 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (remarking that a student will not receive an interpreter if IDEA does not require
it); Peck, 148 F.3d at 629 (Daughtrey, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Peck does not dis-
cuss the possibilities of future IDEA services because the Amendments no longer require
LEAs to pay for private school services if they have offered FAPE to the student).
137. See William L. Dowling, Comment, Special Education and the Private School Stu-
dent: The Mistake of the IDEA Amendments Act, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 88 (Fall 1997)
(concluding that the Zobrest Court should have considered the case in light of the parental
placement provisions, because its holding is "insignificant" in light of the Amendments);
see also Mawdsley, supra note 121, at 446 (discussing the increasing litigation over this is-
sue).
138. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 86.
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II. THE AMENDMENTS' EFFECT ON THE EDUCATION OF DISABLED
CHILDREN ENROLLED IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS BY THEIR PARENTS
IDEA is a statute designed to ensure an appropriate education to all
disabled children.139 This purpose, however, is thwarted by the statute's
limitations that affect disabled children voluntarily enrolled in private
schools by their parents.' 4° Through the Amendments, Congress has re-
141stricted the amount of services available to these students.
A. The Amendments' Toll on the Children: Congress' Role in the
Education of the Disabled
When implementing IDEA more than twenty years ago,142 Congress
set limits upon the special education offered by public schools to volun-
tarily enrolled private school students.' 3 Congress stated that if parents
choose to enroll their children in a private school, and the public school
has awarded a FAPE, the public school does not have to pay for the cost
of the education.' 44 Public schools would still, however, provide special
education and related services. This provision makes sense, because
taxpayers should not have to bear the cost of private school tuition.
4 6
Nevertheless, public policy suggests that public school payment of serv-
ices is logical because regardless of the parents' choice, some students
cannot learn without the aid of related services such as sign language in-
terpreters and instructional aides. 47
139. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1998); see also Board of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982) (holding that the public school program must confer an
educational benefit on the child).
140. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(i) (providing that states need not pay for the full
cost of education at a private school, including special education and related services, if
the public school has awarded a FAPE to the student).
141. See id.
142. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. 11989)).
143. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.403 (1998).
144. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1994).
145. See id.
146. See 143 CONG. REC. H2536 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Castle)
(explaining that the Amendments will lower costs to taxpayers by discouraging parents
from choosing elite private schools for their children).
147. See Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Special Education and Related Services for Parochial
School Students, 81 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1, 2 (1993) (stating that some related services,
such as sign language interpreters, cannot be provided off-site); Dowling, supra note 137,
at 82 (noting that a hearing-impaired child would find an interpreter useless unless the in-
terpreter was present in the classroom, regardless whether in a public or private school).
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IDEA states that public schools must provide disabled private school
students with services comparable in quality to those offered to public
school students. A deaf student needs a sign language interpreter or a.. / 149
hearing aid regardless of the type of school he attends. Such a service
will be the same in the public school and in the private school because
the interpreter will be performing the same role in both schools, and
therefore, these services are comparable in quality. Yet, the provision
regarding the extent to which LEAs must provide related services, along
with the question of where services would be provided, encounter many
diverse judicial interpretations."5 ° Thus, no standard was established for
determining these issues."'
The 1997 Amendments resolved these ambiguities." Congress
achieved its goal of clarification, but also restricted severely the services
to which voluntarily enrolled private school children with disabilities are
now entitled. 53 The Amendments revise the private school provision by
148. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.455(a)(1) (1998).
149. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 82.
150. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1997)
(comparing Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997) and
Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2nd Cir. 1996) with K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch.
Corp., 125 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 1997) and Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363
(4th Cir. 1991)).
151. Compare Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 907 F. Supp. 966 (D. La.
1995) (holding, pre-Amendments, that a hearing-impaired student should receive inter-
preter services at his Catholic school because the student demonstrated a genuine need for
the services), rev'd 117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997), with K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch.
Corp., 81 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that even pre-Amendments IDEA did not
require LEAs to provide services for voluntarily enrolled private school students), vacated
and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.).
152. See The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (Supp. III
1998)).
153. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 80 (stating that Congress "delivered a major blow
to the disabled" by passing the Amendments, and that the Amendments "essentially de-
stroy[] a court's ability" to order a public school to pay for services at private schools). See
generally James D. Oegema, Note, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Ensuring
an Education for Individuals or Ensuring an Education for Individuals Who Attend Public
Schools?, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 97 (1997) (considering circuit courts' conflicting
interpretations of the relevant IDEA provisions and comparing a discretionary approach
with a limited discretion approach, although not discussing the Amendments). Under a
discretionary approach, schools have no requirement to provide children voluntarily en-
rolled in private schools with related services. See id. at 117-18. It is entirely at the
school's discretion; services at the private school are comparable to those at the public
school only if and when the state provides services at the private school. See id. Under
the limited discretion approach, favored by Oegema, entitlement to services exists for pri-
vate school children. See id. at 119. It is a limited entitlement, however, dictated by the
number and the location of the private school students. See id. Thus, public schools
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stating explicitly that a LEA is not required to pay for the cost of educa-
tion, including special education and related services, once it has offered
a FAPE to the disabled child.'- 4 Voluntarily enrolled private school chil-
dren with disabilities are entitled to some federal funding, proportionate
to the number and location of all disabled children located within the ju-
risdiction, 55 but LEAs need only provide, at their discretion, special edu-
cation services for these students. 6 One court notes that the Amend-
ments seem to include all disabled private school students, but that they
do not seem to consider that not every disabled student will receive serv-
ices."'
These restrictions will likely have a negative impact on the appropri-
ateness of education provided to voluntarily enrolled disabled students,
as well as potentially life-long effects on the learning capabilities of these
students. 8 Although Congress' motives for the Amendments are under-
standable, decreasing public school spending should be secondary to en-
suring an appropriate education to disabled students 9  Congress does
not realize that there are disabled students who depend on related serv-
ices to learn their curricula.' ° Furthermore, even if the students could
receive an appropriate education in a public school, there are other rea-
sons, such as religion, why parents would choose to enroll their disabled
children in private schools. 161 IDEA's provision that LEAs need not ex-
should exercise discretion only when economies of scale direct. See id. at 123. This ap-
proach, according to Oegema, does not juxtapose the plain meaning of IDEA. See id. He
notes that both approaches limit parental choices, but that the limited discretion approach
"essentially eliminates the disability as a factor in choosing a school." Id. at 124. On the
other hand, if a discretionary approach is taken, disabled private school students will have
to attend public schools to receive support services such as sign language interpreters. See
id. at 97.
154. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (Supp. III 1998).
155. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I).
156. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(A); Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437
(10th Cir. 1997).
157. See Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1437 n.5.
158. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 80 (concluding that denial of necessary services
will harm disabled students for life, especially in their rights to be treated equally as citi-
zens).
159. See 143 CONG. REC. H2537 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Barrett)
(advocating the idea that education is Congress' priority by stating that disabled students
should not experience a decrease in their services because federal funds will supplement
local monies).
160. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 82 (calling attention to the fact that a child is de-
nied a genuine opportunity for equitable participation in related services if the only way
he can benefit from the service is during classroom instruction, but the service is only of-
fered outside of classroom instruction, especially if the service is a sign language inter-
preter).
161. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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ceed their federal funding obligation 62 validates public schools' choice to
spend only that amount, and nothing at all from LEAs' state and local
funds. It certainly does not provide an incentive for public schools to ex-
tend their resources to aid disabled private school students.
The DOE has issued final rules that elaborate on the revised provi-
sions of the IDEA. 64 These rules correspond to the Amendments and
affirm that the IDEA provisions regarding voluntarily enrolled private
school students have been constricted.' The rules clarify that the LEA
need not collectively allot funds to all disabled private school students,
but instead the LEA can determine which students will receive services
and what services the LEA will provide.'6 The regulation makes clear
that the provision of services is discretionary. 67 Thus, it is solely within
the power of the LEA to determine whether a disabled child is entitled
to services, whether the services should be provided on-site at the private
school, how the services should be provided, and even how the services
should be evaluated.'6
Congress has determined that the states can decide where related
services will be offered to private school students.'69 It seems pointless,
however, to find that a disabled child is entitled to federal funding, and
162. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. III 1998); Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Zelinsky, supra note 47, at 760 (dis-
cussing how IDEA's status as an unfunded mandate leaves less than a desirable amount of
money for free and appropriate education).
163. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 64 Fed.
Reg. 12,406, 12,410 (1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.453) (stating that "LEAs are
not prohibited" from spending money on disabled students at private school, which hardly
puts pressure on LEAs to do so) (emphasis added).
164. See id. at 12,445-47 (publishing the final DOE regulations).
165. See id. at 12,445 (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.454(b)) (giving a significant
amount of discretion to LEAs to decide how many disabled private school students will
receive services and what those services will be); see also Oegema, supra note 153, at 109-
10, 118 (pointing out that as long as FAPE is provided in public school, a state has little
obligation to a disabled private school student under the new Amendments as clarified by
DOE's regulations).
166. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 12,445.
167. See id. See generally Oegema, supra note 153, at 105 (explaining that the circuit
courts that have adopted the discretionary approach have ruled that public schools are not
required to provide on-site services at private schools, as long as a FAPE has been pro-
vided at a public school).
168. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 12,445.
169. See H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 91 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 89
(stating that IDEA "includes an obligation on a State . . . to provide a proportionate
amount of IDEA funds to private schools in which children with disabilities are enrolled,
and, to the extent consistent with law, at [sftate discretion, to provide services on the prem-
ises of private.., schools") (emphasis added).
Catholic University Law Review
then to declare that the services cannot be provided at the child's private
school-the best place for the student to benefit from the services.1 70 If a
private school child has a hearing impairment and cannot learn effec-
tively without an interpreter's assistance, there is no purpose in providing
the funds and subsequently denying the student the interpreter at his or
her own school.1 Therefore, the two regulations-determination of a
student's entitlement to funds and determination of location of serv-
ices-work in tandem.17 ' The regulations are completely ineffective if
one grants funding, but the other denies on-site services. The ultimate
result of this ineffectiveness is that fewer voluntarily enrolled disabled
private school children will receive services if states decide that services
should only be provided at public schools.
173
Congress enacted these provisions for a number of reasons. 174 For ex-
ample, Congress wants to save public schools and taxpayers money, so
that the states can use funds for other educational purposes.175 According
to one member of Congress, the Amendments alleviate school district
costs by discouraging parents from placing their child in a prestigious
private school at public expense.176 While a school district incurs a sig-
nificant cost in paying for a private school child's special education serv-
ices,177 it does not necessarily experience this cost because parents want
170. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 82 (maintaining that a child who needs a sign lan-
guage interpreter or hearing device to learn requires this service in the classroom, where it
is most helpful to the child, in order to reap the benefits of federal funding); see also Os-
borne, supra note 147, at 2.
171. See Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 222 (2nd Cir. 1998) (holding that
even if the student is entitled to federal funding, the state has discretion to deny her serv-
ices on-site). The Russman court explains in a footnote that location of services also de-
pends upon entitlement, i.e., whether the state has determined under IDEA that the stu-
dent is entitled to the funds. See id. at 221 n.1.
172. See id. at 221 n.1. If the court or the LEA determines that there is no entitlement,
then the issue of location of services need not be decided. See id.
173. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
174. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431,1435 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997)
(observing that Congress raised several issues, with little discussion, including making it
more difficult to place children in private schools, requiring states to spend federal funds
for private school children, and states needing only to provide FAPE in a public school in
order to refrain from providing state funds for private school children); see also 143 CONG.
REC. H2536 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Castle); 143 CONG. REC. S4300
(daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
175. See 143 CONG. REC. H2536 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Castle).
176. See id.
177. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 94 (explaining that, in light of Russman v. Sobol,
which granted on-site services, school boards in the Second Circuit face great costs if they
have to pay for every disabled child's service at a private school). Thus, it would be diffi-
cult to determine economies of scale. See id. For example, if the school hires three occu-
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to send their child to an expensive private school. 1
7 8
When parents send their child to private school, they have their child's
best interests in mind, and they seek to ensure an appropriate education
for him or her.79 Parents can have a variety of reasons for choosing pri-
vate schools over public ones. As previously mentioned, some parents
choose private schools for religious reasons;18° others choose them be-
cause they believe a smaller setting will address their child's special
needs better.18 1 Some parents remove their child from public school be-
cause they feel that the FAPE is not appropriate and they want those
schools to pay for the child's services at a private institution.' These
parents may be able to afford the private school tuition, but cannot pay
for the related services.13 Others ask that the services be offered at the
private school so that their child's education and daily activities are not
interrupted by transportation to a public school.' 84
Perhaps to thwart criticism of the restrictions placed on disabled stu-
dents attending private school, Congress explains that the Amendments
intend to improve the appropriateness of the public education offered to
disabled students.'85 The Amendments provide for better programs and
pational therapists for every fourteen students, the minimum number of students that
must attend the private school before a therapist would be provided would be five. See id.
A problem arises when there are six children enrolled at the private school. See id. An-
other therapist might be necessary if one could not work with all six children. See id.
Hence, a greater cost incurs to the public school if it must pay for the second therapist, a
cost which is reduced if the services were provided at the public school. See id.
178. See id.; supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
179. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1433 (10th Cir. 1997).
180. See supra note 50.
181. See Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1433.
182. See id. (explaining that the student's parents chose a private school because they
believed that his intellectual gifts would be "better met" at a private school than at a pub-
lic school); Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 220 (2nd Cir. 1997) (recognizing that
the parties agree on the need for services, but disagree as to the location of services); Ce-
falu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Flor-
ence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993) (holding that parents may be reim-
bursed for removing their child from an inappropriate IEP and placing her in an
appropriate private program, even though the private school does not meet IDEA stan-
dards).
183. See Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050, 1052 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. granted and judg-
ment vacated, 521 U.S. 114 (1997) (mem.), rev'd 150 F.3d 219 (2nd Cir. 1998).
184. See Peck v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 148 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
student's parents wanted the services offered on-site so that they would not interfere with
her daily activities).
185. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 62 Fed.
Reg. 55,026, 55,028 (1997) (detailing Congress' intent to improve results for children with
disabilities by ensuring these children's access to the general public curriculum, strength-
ening the role of parents, and fostering partnerships between parents and schools).
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better-trained teachers, and ensure that schools will keep parents well-
informed. 16 Congress has a benevolent motive, but it has not considered
that the Amendments limit parents in their choice of their disabled
child's education.""7 Although it is true that some parents may elect to
keep their disabled child in public school because that school meets their
child's needs, it does not follow that parents opting out of this school
should arbitrarily be denied related services. Prior to requiring parents
to prioritize among educational choices, schools should at least deter-
mine the actual cost of providing on-site services.
It is evident that Congress does not realize the impact the Amend-
ments have on disabled private school students and their parents.TM Al-
though the parents have an important concern in the matters of entitle-
ment and their disabled child's individual needs, the child has an even
189greater stake-the location of services. Many children who require
services need them in the classroom because the services facilitate the
children's learning. Under the Amendments, however, the possibility of
on-site services in private schools is remote.' 9 Hence, the DOE regula-
tions addressing entitlement and location may limit students' entire edu-
cation, not merely their related services, especially if these regulations
preclude debate on location by cutting off entitlement.' 9' In other words,
why even consider location of services, when courts will deny the requi-
site entitlement?
Of utmost concern is that without an appropriate education, disabled
children will not become functional adults. The Amendments' narrow
provisions can potentially stunt voluntarily-enrolled disabled children's
development.' 9 If related services cost the same at public and private
schools, and provision of services at the private school does not violate
186. See id.
187. See 143 CONG. REC. H2536 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Castle)
(construing the Amendments as setting obstacles for parents who choose to place their
children in exclusive private schools at taxpayers' expense, but not analyzing other reasons
for enrollment).
188. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1435 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997).
189. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 80 (insisting that the Amendments, as they now
stand, will have devastating long-term effects on the rights of disabled students because
they will limit the services the students receive, hamper parental educational rights, and
potentially deny the student's rights to receive services as adults); see also Osborne, supra
note 147, at 2 (recognizing that pre-Amendments IDEA reduces disabled children's (and
their parents') freedom of religious choice because if they require a related service in the
classroom, then they have no option but to enroll in a public school).
190. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
192. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 80.
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any other statute or regulation, there is no valid reason for not offering
the services at the private school.'9 Furthermore, the regulations provide
that public schools can choose to exceed their funding obligation in order
to provide services at private schools.! If the public schools would con-
template the negative effects the Amendments may have on disabled
private school students voluntarily placed by their parents, perhaps they
would extend their local and state money. The cases decided in light of
the Amendments, however, demonstrate that schools have yet to take
this approach! 9
B. Russman, Anderson, and Fowler:
Missing the Point of On-site Services
Across the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit courts, the cases de-
cided in consideration of the Amendments illustrate a restrictive inter-
pretation of the private school provisions.'94 Through their narrow con-
structions of IDEA provisions, the courts emphasize that they base their' 97
rulings on IDEA's legislative history and DOE's regulations. The par-
ticular facts of each child's situation appear to have little or no bearing
on the decisions.! Furthermore, even though they rationalize that the
LEA has discretion in determining provision of services, the courts fail to
consider that these particular students have disabilities that require on-
site services for the progression and appropriateness of their education.'9
193. See id. at 99 (suggesting that courts should determine whether the cost of the
service would be more expensive at a private school than a public school, and if it costs the
same, to provide the service at the private school, if that is what the parents wish); see also
Oegema, supra note 153, at 123 (arguing for a limited discretion approach granting a pub-
lic school discretion only in providing on-site services when economies of scale so require).
194. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 64 Fed.
Reg. 12,406, 12,445 (1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.453).
195. See Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 222 (2nd Cir. 1998); K.R. v. Ander-
son Community Sch. Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997); Cefalu v. East Baton
Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1997).
196. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222; Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019; Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 232;
see also Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436-37 (10th Cir. 1997) (ex-
plaining that while the court is not as restrictive as IDEA, the statute probably will be in-
terpreted strictly).
197. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222 (citing a House Report); Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019
(citing section 101 of the IDEA Amendments Act); Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 232; Fowler, 128
F.3d at 1435 (citing a House Report).
198. But cf. Willard, supra note 47, at 1169 (asserting the importance of each disabled
child's individual needs, and noting that IDEA does not establish universal principles for
each child, but requires that an IEP be developed as a guideline for each child's educa-
tion).
199. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222 (denying a consultant teacher and teacher's aide on-
site at a private school); Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019 (denying an instructional assistant on-
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All three courts advocate the discretionary approach toward voluntarily
enrolled private school children, although Fowler leans toward the lim-
ited discretion theory. °°
1. Russman v. Board of Education
The key issue in Russman concerned the location of services. °' In de-
termining whether the student should have a consultant teacher and
teacher's aide at her private Catholic school, the court discussed in a
footnote that the Amendments do not clarify whether federal funds must
be proportionately spent on all disabled students or whether the LEA
determines who receives services. 20 2  The court did not consider the
DOE's proposed regulations, but assumed for present purposes that the
student was entitled to her proportionate funds.' °3 Despite the entitle-
ment, the court held that it is within the state's discretion to provide on-
site services; the state is not required to provide the services at the
Catholic school.2°4 Given IDEA's silence on the location of services, the
court found that state discretion is the determining factor. Thus, ac-
cording to the court, the state need not provide the consultant teacher
and aide at the Catholic school2O
In deciding that the student was entitled to federal funding, the court
207should have analyzed the reasons for entitlement. It should have con-
site at a private school); Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 233 (denying a sign-language interpreter on-
site at a private school); supra note 147 and accompanying text (recognizing that a private
school student will not benefit from a sign language interpreter if the public school denies
the service on-site).
200. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222 (referring to Congress' interpretation that it is at
the states' discretion to provide on-site services); Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1439 (noting that
states can choose to provide more funding than the mandatory proportionate federal
amount, and forecasting that although the student will not receive full funding, he will
probably receive some amount of aid in the private school); Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019
(holding that a LEA need not provide related services to a voluntarily enrolled private
school student if a LEA offers FAPE to that student); Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 233 (finding
that, having offered FAPE, LEA did not have to provide an on-site interpreter to a pri-
vate school student); Schwartz, supra note 50, at 807 (interpreting Fowler as reinforcing a
limited discretion approach and criticizing this theory as full of public policy problems, one
of which is to encourage parents to remove their disabled children from public schools for
any reason); supra note 153 (discussing the differences between the discretionary and the
limited discretion approaches).
201. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 220.
202. See id. at 221 n.1 (quoting Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1437).
203. See id. at 221.
204. See id. at 222.
205. See id. (exploring legislative history to find that states may choose whether or not
to provide related services on-site).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 221 & n.2. Instead of analyzing the reasons for entitlement, the court
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sidered the student's specific needs, which require a teacher to help her
understand the academic subjects of English and math.20 8 It should have
also determined whether the service would cost the same at the public
school as at the private school.2°9 Finally, the court should have also rec-
ognized that the parents' reason for enrolling the student at a Catholic
school was so she could attend school with her two sisters.21° In disre-
garding these logical reasons, the court suggests that disabled private
school students will not be receiving services, even if the services are cru-
cial to their education. If a child is entitled to funding, there is a likeli-
hood that he will still be denied services on-site at his private school.211
Hence, the parents' choice in Russman is necessarily defeated. The
student's services must be provided at the school she attends, while she is
212in the classroom. For the parents, their only option is to enroll their
daughter in a public school because it is the only location where the con-
sultant teacher can help her.213 Consequently, the court leaves parents
and children with no meaningful choice; instead, it leaves the matter en-
214
tirely up to state discretion.
2. K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp.
The Anderson court arrived at a similar decision regarding provision of
services.15 It did not, however, consider the issue of federal funding.1 6
Instead, the court relied on a statement of position filed by the United
States, asserting that the Amendments do not change the court's prior
holding that the student is not entitled to an instructional aide at her pa-
rochial school. 217 The court further found that the Amendments rein-
merely stated that either the student would be entitled or not. See id.
208. See Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050, 1053 (2nd Cir. 1996) (stating that the parents
wanted the teacher to help the student with core subjects, such as English and math), va-
cated and remanded sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Russman, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.).
209. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
210. See Russman, 85 F.3d at 1052.
211. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222 (explaining that despite entitlement, a student may
not receive services if the state decides not to provide them on-site at the private school).
212. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 82 (noting that the service would be "useless"
unless provided in the setting where the student learns); Osborne, supra note 147, at 2.
213. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222. When the court refuses to provide the teacher at
the private school, and the student cannot be educated without the teacher, she must enter
a public school. See id.
214. See id.
215. See K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997).
216. See id. Nowhere in the opinion is the federal funding obligation mentioned. See
id. The court does rule, however, that states and localities have no obligation to use their
own monies for private school services. See id.
217. See id.
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force the premise that states and local agencies need not spend their own
money to ensure that voluntarily enrolled private school children with
disabilities receive services comparable to those given to public school
children with disabilities. 8 It also denied the student's Free Exercise
claim, holding that the school district provided speech and physical ther-
apy at a public school during the student's enrollment at the parochial
school, and this service did not interfere with religious choice."9
The court also dismissed the student's request that the Amendments
not apply to the time period during which the prior case was remanded
and vacated by the Supreme Court. ° In doing so, the court held that the
Amendments did not change IDEA, and that even if they did, IDEA is
not retroactive.22 The Anderson court takes the opposite view of retro-
activity than the court in Fowler; whereas the retroactive issue helps the
222student in Fowler, it harms the student in Anderson. The discussion of
retroactivity is the most illuminating of the Anderson court's views; the
rest of the opinion is wholly dependent on the Government's position
and text of the Amendments. 3
Employing a seemingly arbitrary rationale, the court fails to consider
the student's needs.22 The student cannot learn without an instructional
218. See id. at 1018-19 (referring to the court's earlier opinion, which held that states
have discretion and only need to provide voluntarily enrolled private school students who
are disabled a genuine opportunity for equitable participation under the IDEA).
219. See id. at 1019 (noting that provision of the related services at a public school was
wholly neutral, illustrating that the government neither favored nor disproved of the stu-
dent's religious preference).
220. See id. at 1019 n.1.
221. See id. (opining that were the court to regard the Amendments as changing,
rather than clarifying, the existing IDEA, any change would not apply to the period before
the Amendments because the IDEA is not retroactive).
222. Compare Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir.
1997) (noting that the Amendments are not retroactive, and thus mandating that the dis-
trict pay for interpreter services at the private school only up to the average amount re-
quired to provide the services in the public school) with Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019 n.1
(determining that the court does not need to consider the student's education between the
earlier decision's vacation and the Supreme Court's remand, and finding the Amendments
are not retroactive; so, even if the Amendments evinced a change, the court would not ap-
ply it to the student's situation). Fowler and Anderson arrived at different results because
the courts took positions at the opposite ends of the same spectrum. The court of appeals
in Fowler chose to grant on-site services to the student before the Supreme Court vacated
the case. See Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1433. The court of appeals in Anderson chose to deny
on-site services before the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See Anderson, 125 F.3d at
1018.
223. See Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019.
224. See id. (stating only that the Amendments are unambiguous and thus, states need
not spend their own money to fund comparable services for disabled private school stu-
dents).
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aide, for her disability is severe.225 Regardless of whether she can receive
speech and physical therapy at a public school, she requires help in posi-
tioning, reaching, and expressing herself in the classroom.226 Also, the
mother's function as her aide in the parochial school227 suggests that the
parents wanted their daughter to attend a religious institution for the• • 228
sake of religious instruction. The court should have also determined
whether the aide would cost the same at the public school.229
Significantly, by not mentioning the federal funding provision, the
court indicated that it was not concerned with the individual's situation .2
By disregarding completely the states' obligation to allot federal funding
for disabled private school students, the court suggests that all services
operate at the states' discretion.23' Yet, it notes that neither the proposed
232
nor the final regulations existed at the time of the case. Thus, there
was no clarification that the LEA would determine which disabled chil-
dren are entitled to which services. The court should have mentioned
that federal funding is available and mandated, even if it later decided
233
that the student was not entitled to such funding. By not doing this, it
seems to ignore any possibility of a moderate interpretation of the
Amendments.2m Such a restrictive construction demonstrates that the
Anderson court is leading the way toward the potential destruction of the
private school education of the disabled.
3. Fowler v. Unified School District
The most liberal interpretation of IDEA and the Amendments oc-
curred in Fowler, even though the court eventually held in favor of the
Amendments."' Viewing IDEA as prospective, the court found that its
225. See Anderson, 81 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1996) (detailing the student's disabilities
as spina bifida, myelomeningocele, and hydrocephalus with a shunt), vacated and re-
manded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.).
226. See id.
227. See id. at 676.
228. See id.
229. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
230. See K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997).
231. See id. By not even discussing federal funding, the court implies that the states
will decide who receives services. See id. Its determination that the Amendments clearly
do not require states to pay for private school services also reinforces this notion. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. (noting that the Amendments are the final determination of services and
that they do not mandate that states pay for private school services to ensure that those
services can be comparable to those given to public schools).
235. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1997)
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prior interpretation of IDEA should apply before the Amendments' ef-
fective date of June 4, 1997.236 It had originally decided that the public
school must provide a sign language interpreter to the hearing-impaired
student at a cost not exceeding that provided to public school students. 
7
Therefore, this interpretation applied until June 4, 1997, and the district
court has had to determine what, if any, services are offered since that
date.' 38
The court noted that IDEA did not clarify whether each disabled stu-
dent is individually entitled to services or collectively entitled as a
239group. It also recognized that the proposed regulations give the LEA
discretion in deciding which students get which services, and that this
provision may result in some students receiving no services at all.2 ° The
realization that the Amendments may have negative consequences, cou-
pled with the acknowledgment of the parents' desire to place the student1-. 41
in a school that serves his gifted capabilities, shows that the Fowler
court considered the child's needs more than the other courts.242
The Tenth Circuit also mentioned that the Amendments provide a
proportionate amount of federal funds for special education services.243
It noted, however, that voluntarily enrolled private school students with
disabilities are not entitled to the full cost of their education, and that af-
ter June 4, 1997, public schools need only spend their obligated federal
funds.24" The court's approach suggests that it believes the Amendments
should be more concerned with the students than with payments. 24' Even
though it also presumed that the parents would receive a lesser amount
of funds after June 4, 1997, the court concluded that the parents would
probably receive a sum greater than zero.2' Thus, Fowler has proven to
be the only case of the three discussed that encourages public schools to
go beyond the requisite amount of funding.247
(concluding that the Amendments apply to the student from their effective date, June 4,
1997, onward).
236. See id. at 1436.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 1439.
239. See id. at 1437.
240. See id. at 1437 n.5.
241. See id. at 1433.
242. See id. at 1433, 1437 n.5.
243. See id. at 1434.
244. See id. at 1437.
245. See id. at 1437 n.5 (noting that Congress does not realize the full implications of
the Amendments, most importantly, the denial of services to some students).
246. See id. at 1439.
247. But cf. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 807 (asserting that Fowler grants too much dis-
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C. Zobrest and Peck: Proving that IDEA Does Not Violate the
Establishment Clause, but Foreshadowing More Denials of Services
The Establishment Clause cases demonstrate positive law for the pro-
vision of special education services to disabled students in parochial
schools. 24 In determining that IDEA does not violate the Establishment
Clause because its provisions neither add nor subtract from the religious
environment, the Supreme Court enabled students to receive services at
their parochial schoolsY29 This ruling was followed in the circuit courts.250
Yet these cases miss a crucial point by not discussing the entitlement is-
sue.2 1 The decisions would likely have been different if they had deter-
mined whether IDEA requires public schools to pay for services at paro-
chial schools. 52
cretion to the parents and, moreover, that the decision exhausts limited public school
money in order to fund extra expenses associated with on-site related services). Schwartz
finds that restricting private school costs to the average costs of public schools fails to
serve its purpose. See id. at 807-08. He argues that defining "'similarly situated students"'
creates a burden because different students need different services. See id. at 808, quoting
Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259, 107 F.3d 797, 807-08 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated
sub nom., 521 U.S. 1115 (1997) (mem.). Schwartz also contends that public schools are
better equipped to provide related services because they have specialized staff and materi-
als. See id.
248. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993); Peck v.
Lansing Sch. Dist., 148 F.3d 619, 628-29 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that Agostini's holding
rejects the school district's argument that provision of related services at a parochial
school violates the Establishment Clause).
249. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14. Legal scholars view Zobrest as advocating the ac-
commodation of religion, but doing so by directly ignoring previous Establishment Clause
conventions. See Baxter, supra note 116, at 381, 384 (recognizing that Zobrest evinces a
transformation in Establishment Clause principles, and that Lemon has endured signifi-
cant critical scrutiny); Lindeman, supra note 121, at 892 (arguing that Zobrest's holding
"restructure[s] Establishment Clause jurisprudence"); Missy McJunkins, Note, 20 U. ARK.
LITrLE ROCK L.J. 813, 825 (noting that Zobrest's accommodationist approach abandons
judicial precedent and leaves lower courts and Establishment Clause scholars wondering
about Lemon's viability).
250. See Peck, 148 F.3d at 628-29.
251. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 88 (commenting that Zobrest left unresolved the
issue of entitlement, and suggesting that the decision is most likely insignificant due to the
circuit court rulings against entitlement). Peck, too, should have discussed the issue, espe-
cially because the Amendments were in effect at the time of the case. See Peck, 148 F.3d
at 626. If the Peck court had discussed the issue, it may have resolved future litigation
concerning Establishment Clause and entitlement issues. See id. at 629 (Daughtrey, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that the Amendments control all future entitlement issues).
252. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 15-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that the ma-
jority should have considered the entitlement issue, for if it had, the decision likely would
have been vacated and remanded to determine this issue); Peck, 148 F.3d at 629
(Daughtrey, J., concurring) (noting that the case does not concern future IDEA issues due
to the Amendments, and suggesting that the Amendments will preclude any future issues
of entitlement).
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1. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Zobrest reinforced the notion that
IDEA benefits students, not parochial schools, in providing on-site serv-
ices."' Rehnquist recognized that the parents of a hearing-impaired stu-
dent enrolled their son in a Catholic school for religious reasons. 25 Al-
though these motives are important ones that support the education of
disabled parochial school students, they are not the only ones the Court
should have examined. "' The Court did not consider the public school's
claim that IDEA does not require sign language interpreters to be pro-
vided at sectarian schools, because it found that the Establishment
Clause was the only concern at the time." It rationalized this decision by
stating that only First Amendment issues were brought in the appeals
court, and the Supreme Court usually does not consider issues not raised
in the court of appeals.
The dissent, however, took the entitlement issue into account, opining
that the majority should have vacated to consider the non-constitutional
questions of federal and statutory law. 58 It also believed that the parents
would not get the services they seek if a federal statute does not require a
sign language interpreter in a sectarian school.
5 9
2. Peck v. Lansing School District
The Sixth Circuit in Peck followed Zobrest's route by not considering
the entitlement issue at all.26° Although recognizing the Amendments'
existence, the court held that the disabled student's entitlement to serv-
ices was not at issue. 2" Rather, it discussed the location of services,"'taking the opposite approach of most circuit courts, which do not con-
253. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14. Scholars have attacked this theory as encouraging
impermissible government subsidy of religious institutions. See Lindeman, supra note 121,
at 891 (disputing the child benefit theory because it fails to realize that a sign language in-
terpreter conveys religious doctrine through his work, which effectively promotes gov-
ernment inculcation of religion).
254. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
255. See id. at 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the entitlement issue, and
stating that the majority should have vacated to consider the non-constitutional ques-
tions).
256. See id. at 7.
257. See id. at 8 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 & n.2 (1970)).
258. See id. at 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 15-16.
260. See Peck v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 148 F.3d 619, 626 & n.8 (6th Cir. 1998).
261. See id. (stating that the court had no opinion concerning the Amendments' appli-
cation to the student's entitlement).
262. See id. at 624 (quoting the district court).
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sider location without entitlement. 3
In Peck, the parents of a student with brittle bone disease sought to
have their daughter's physical and occupational therapy sessions pro-
vided at her Lutheran school during her physical education period.2M
They explained that sessions at their home either disrupted her sleep
schedule or interfered with her homework and afterschool activities.25
As in Russman, Anderson, and Fowler, the court did not fully discuss
the student's needs, but it cited the Zobrest decision and applied the Ag-
ostini holding.266 Agostini found that as long as instruction enhances but
does not replace regularly provided services, the program ensures a
secular purpose and derives from neutral criteria, so it does not violate
the Establishment Clause.67 The student's services fit these factors; thus,
they could be provided at the Lutheran school.2 Yet, in failing to con-
sider whether IDEA entitled the student to these services, the court
skipped an important step. If it had chosen to apply the Amendments, it
probably would have determined that the student was not even entitled
to special education and related services, and thus, the location of the
services would have been moot.2 69
3. Zobrest and Peck: Foreshadowing a Murky Future
The dissent in Zobrest is correct-the majority should have considered
the entitlement issue.270 The Zobrest ruling, and Peck's application of it,
263. See, e.g., Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 221 n.1 (2nd Cir. 1998) (ex-
plaining that if the student were not entitled to funding in the first place, the location issue
would never arise).
264. See Peck, 148 F.3d at 622.
265. See id. (contending that these services should be provided at the school because
the IDEA (pre-Amendments) necessitated that disabled private school students receive
benefits comparable to disabled public school students).
266. See id at 628-29 (reasoning that Zobrest demonstrated a shift from judicial pres-
ervation of the separation between church and state, and that Agostini's holding affirmed
this shift and supported the parents' argument).
267. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997).
268. See Peck, 148 F.3d at 628-29 (summarizing the district court's analysis of the Es-
tablishment Clause in terms of Zobrest and Agostini and its specific finding that no exces-
sive government entanglement with religion existed).
269. See Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219, 221 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1998). The Peck
Court would have used an analysis similar to that in Russman. See Peck, 148 F.3d at 626
(considering how the court did not discuss the student's entitlement to related services);
Peck, 148 F.3d at 629 (Daughtrey, J., concurring) (stating that the Amendments would
preclude any entitlement).
270. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 16 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority would have vacated and remanded the case, if it
considered the entitlement issue).
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will affect future litigation on the Establishment Clause question" be-
cause public schools are likely to raise the entitlement issue in light of the
Amendments. Thus, there will likely be a decrease in Establishment
Clause claims, as parents will have virtually no law to support their alle-
gations against the public schools. 272 The public schools can also rely on
circuit court decisions, which narrowly construe the Amendments, tosupprt heir ... 273
support their positions. Peck is an anomaly that will probably not be
sufficient to help parents, particularly because it stated that it chose not
to apply the Amendments.274 In essence, regardless of these rulings, pub-
lic school districts will not need to pay for services at parochial schools. 5
Instead, parents should consider raising Free Exercise claims.276 Par-
ents may argue that the Amendments restrict their religious freedom by
arbitrarily denying their disabled children services necessary to their
education, and leave them no choice but to enroll in public schools.
277
But, unfortunately, the future will probably not be a promising one for
private school parents of disabled children.
271. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 88 (observing that the Zobrest majority opinion
left unresolved the issue of entitlement, and that this oversight will probably increase
IDEA litigation); see also Mawdsley, supra note 121, at 445-46 (noting that the decision
not to discuss the entitlement issue has resulted in conflicting circuit court interpretations
of the provision).
272. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Peck, 148 F.3d at 629
(Daughtrey, J., concurring) (recognizing the effect of the Amendments on public schools'
need to pay for related services at private schools once FAPE has been awarded).
273. See Russman, 150 F.3d at 222; K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 128 F.3d
1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997); Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Board, 117 F.3d 231,
232 (5th Cir. 1997).
274. See Peck, 148 F.3d at 626.
275. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. III 1998); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 16
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that students will not receive services due to the
statute); Peck, 148 F.3d at 629 (Daughtrey, J., concurring) (remarking that the Amend-
ments will eliminate the entitlement issue if it arises in the future); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a)
(1998).
276. But see Anderson, 125 F.3d at 1019 (striking down the Free Exercise claim
brought by parents, finding that the public school offered a genuine opportunity to receive
services at the public school, where the student had been receiving services until her paro-
chial school enrollment).
277. See id.; see also Osborne, supra note 147, at 2 (stressing that disabled children
have little freedom of choice compared to their non-disabled peers, and suggesting that
this freedom is restricted even more when the parents must choose between an education
without related services at a parochial school and appropriate education at a less desirable
public school).
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III. A NEW APPROACH TO THE AMENDMENTS MAY SIGNAL A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF DISABLED CHILDREN'S NEEDS
Courts must examine the entitlement and location of services issues in
direct correlation to the particular student's disability and the cost to
maintain services on-site. As in Fowler, courts should consider that
IDEA may deny services to some private school children with disabili-
ties.278 They may also analyze whether parents have waived their rights
to entitlement by choosing private schools.279 Courts may decide that
parents should prioritize their goals-either enroll their children in pri-
vate schools and possibly be denied services, or enroll them in public
schools and receive at least some form of service.) Courts should not,
however, brush aside the federal funding obligation, and interpret the
Amendments strictly. They should go one step further and grant services
through a collective entitlement, and then, on a case by case approach,
analyze the level of intensity of each particular service, as well as the cost
to provide that service.
In choosing this limited discretion approach,281 courts should abide by
278. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); see
also Schwartz, supra note 50, at 809 (opining that no disabled student should be denied
equal access to an appropriate education, but supporting state discretion in deciding the
components of an appropriate education). This viewpoint in effect refuses special educa-
tion and related services to many voluntarily enrolled private schools students with dis-
abilities.
279. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 803. Schwartz notes that students who attend pri-
vate schools do not waive their rights to FAPE at public expense because the public school
may choose to place the students in a private setting. See id. Reading between the lines,
however, those students voluntarily placed in private schools essentially lose their rights to
publicly funded FAPE because the Amendments do not guarantee such rights. See id. at
803-04.
280. But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 234 (1972) (holding that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments preclude states from mandating Amish parents to send their
children to public schools, and finding that parents have the right to educate their children
under a private system); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that
parents have a constitutional right to raise their children by their own values, including the
choice of education); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996). Gilles promotes a liberal constitutional theory of parental
educational rights, contending that parents have this constitutional right because they usu-
ally act with their children's best interests in mind. See id. at 940. In determining whether
the state or the parents should decide what educational matters are in the best interests of
the child's education, this theory favors the parents, because they are the "more faithful
educational guardians." Id. Gilles argues that the state educational requirements might
undermine parental values. See id. at 946.
281. See Oegema, supra note 153, at 111 (explaining that Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1997), Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 103
F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997), and Russman v. Sobol, 81 F.3d 1050 (2nd Cir. 1996) all use a lim-
ited discretion approach by finding that a public school only has discretion in providing
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certain standards. First, if the school is a parochial one, the program
must not violate the Establishment Clause, as demonstrated by Zobrest,
Agostini, and Peck.m Second, LEAs must make special education and
related services available to all disabled students.' 3 Unfortunately, states
are allotted only a proportionate amount of federal funds for voluntarily-
enrolled private school children.2 These funds must be divided in a
manner that ensures the education of all disabled private school chil-
dren.2 A collective entitlement to federal funding is necessary, but it
should be apportioned according to whether disabled students can be
provided a genuine opportunity for equitable participation if the services
are provided on-site.2 If a student can receive a genuine opportunity
off-site and the services cost less at the public school, the student must
on-site services when economies of scale require that the services be offered at the public
school). Russman held that if cost did not differ, services should be provided at the private
school. See id. at 112. Cefalu employed a burden shifting test-the student must show
genuine need for on-site services, and the public school must provide them unless "'a justi-
fiable reason, economic or non-economic,"' exists. See id. Then, the student must show
that the public school's position is inconsistent with IDEA, or is irrational or arbitrary.
See id. This test results in comparable services offered at the private school. See id
Russman and Cefalu have been reversed since publication of Oegema's article, but they
illustrate how the limited discretion theory operates in practice. But see Schwartz, supra
note 50, at 807-08 (contending that the limited discretion approach is problematic because
its average cost theory subsidizes insufficient special education resources in an inefficient
manner).
282. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (finding that federally funded
remedial programs offered in a parochial school do not violate the Establishment Clause
because they do not advance religion, create an excessive entanglement, or promote any-
thing other than a secular purpose); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-
14 (1993) (holding that provision of a sign language interpreter to a parochial school stu-
dent does not offend the Establishment Clause because the student, not the school, re-
ceives the benefit of the interpreter); Peck v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 148 F.3d 619, 628-29 (6th
Cir. 1998) (determining that provision of physical therapy and occupational therapy to a
parochial school student upholds the Establishment Clause because it does not advance
religion by "'impermissib[y] supplanting"' services when they are offered on-site at the
parochial school); see also Dowling, supra note 137, at 98 (explaining that the service
should be analyzed in terms of the Lemon test's second and third factors to determine if it
is advancing religion or entangling government and religion). But cf. Lindeman, supra
note 121, at 887 (suggesting that Zobrest in fact violates the Lemon prongs, because the
Court ignored a genuine constitutional challenge in not applying the prongs, and encour-
aged an accommodationist approach toward government subsidy of religion).
283. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(8), 1412(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1998).
284. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I).
285. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i).
286. See 34 C.F.R. § 76.654(a) (1998) (requiring programs provided for voluntarily-
enrolled private school students with disabilities to "be comparable in quality, scope, and
opportunity for participation" as the programs provided for public school students with
disabilities).
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receive the services at the public school2 7
This determination requires a case-by-case analysis because courts will
be better able to understand the importance of special education services
provided on-site if they know the factual basis of each child's situation.2
If courts realize that a mentally retarded child will not receive a genuine
opportunity for equitable participation in classroom instruction without
the aid of a consultant teacher, they should award the child funds and
provide that service at her private school.
The second step of the analysis requires that the cost of on-site services
should not exceed the cost of those in public schoolsY.2  Thus, if it costs
more to provide a consultant teacher in a private school than it does in a
public school, the public school should not pay for the teacher in the pri-
vate school. Although this recommendation will result in denial of on-
site services, it is both logical and equitable. Public schools should not
incur greater costs in providing services off-site that would cost less at
their own school. Private school students will be treated as equals to
public school students, as long as the costs are the same.291 If the costs
are unequal, the public school should determine another means of pro-
viding a genuine opportunity for equitable participation for voluntarily
enrolled private school children with disabilities9'
This approach balances a well-reasoned interpretation of the Amend-
ments with economies of scale. Under this model, public schools should
287. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 808 (recognizing that related services may cost
more at a private school, and advocating public school provision of special education be-
cause public schools are better able to meet the many diverse needs of disabled children).
288. See Willard, supra note 47, at 1169 (emphasizing that each disabled student has
unique needs); see also Dowling, supra note 137, at 97-98 (recommending that Congress
rescind the Amendments in favor of a case-by-case approach). Dowling proposes a five-
step analysis: (1) identify the nature of the necessary service; (2) analyze the service in
light of the second and third prongs of the Lemon test (namely, if provision of the service
will advance religion, then it will cause an excessive entanglement between government
and religion); (3) determine whether the cost would be different at the private school than
at the public school; (4) if there is a non-economic denial of service, decide whether it is
irrational, arbitrary, or inconsistent with IDEA and DOE regulations; and (5) if there is an
economic denial, determine if providing the service at the public school would be a genu-
ine opportunity for equitable participation, given the nature of the disability. See id.
289. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 99 (arguing that the Supreme Court holds that
services should be based on need, not location, so if the service costs the same at the pub-
lic and private schools, it should be provided at the private school).
290. See id.
291. See id. at 94.
292. See id. at 99 (recommending that the public school find a way to ensure genuine
opportunity for equitable participation of private school students, if the cost is excessive at
the private school); see also 34 C.F.R. § 76.654(a) (1998) (guaranteeing a genuine oppor-
tunity for equitable participation to all private school students with disabilities).
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only deny on-site services at private schools where dictated by economies
of scale. 211 When a disabled student requires a full-time instructional
aide, the aide can help only that particular student; the services would
cost the same at the public and the private school. When a student needs
294a part-time aide, however, the aide can help two or more students. The
services would most likely be less expensive at the public school than the
private school.295 In another scenario, if a disabled student attending pri-
vate school requires physical therapy two afternoons a week, the service
can be provided at a public school without much trouble. 6 Therapy can
probably be offered at a public school without taking away from the stu-
dent's academic curriculum.Y However, if the location of services cre-
ates the only genuine opportunity for equitable participation, and pro-
viding the services at a private school would incur no greater cost, they
should be offered at the private school.29 s
Hence, the limited discretion approach reflects IDEA's goal of ensur-
ing equitable participation for voluntarily enrolled private school stu-
dents with disabilities.299 Courts should favor this approach because it is
293. See Oegema, supra note 153, at 111.
294. See id. at 116 (explaining that a part-time aide at a public school could help two or
more students simultaneously whereas, at a private school, he could help only one student
at a time); see also Schwartz, supra note 50, at 808 (stating that public schools can serve
two multi-disabled students simultaneously, whereas private schools usually cannot).
295. See Oegema, supra note 153, at 116.
296. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 101 (noting that some services, such as physical,
occupational, and speech therapy, can be provided off-site without greatly impeding the
student's education).
297. But see Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1433 (10th Cir. 1997);
Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050, 1053 (2nd Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom. Board of Educ. v.
Russman, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.), affd, Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219
(2nd Cir. 1998); K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 81 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1996),
vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.), affd 125 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 1997).
In all three decisions, disabled students required related services in order to obtain an
education; therefore, the services would be ineffective if provided off-site. See also Os-
borne, supra note 147, at 2 (emphasizing that some services cannot be provided anywhere
but on-site at the private school).
298. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 97-98 (outlining a five-step analysis to determine
whether services can be provided on-site).
299. See Oegema, supra note 153, at 123 (stating that the limited discretion approach
better fulfills Congress' public policy goals in IDEA, because it grants voluntarily enrolled
private school children an education suited for their needs, and gives them the opportunity
to choose a school based on factors other than their disability). Oegema believes that the
discretionary approach limits voluntarily enrolled private school students' entitlement to
services because the students only receive services consistent with the number and loca-
tion of disabled students in the state. See id. at 118. Although limited, the entitlement still
exists. See id. at 119; cf Schwartz, supra note 50, at 807-08 (arguing that the limited discre-
tion approach suggests public policy problems, specifically, that granting parents too much
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in the students' best interests."° While this approach provides an appro-
priate education to all disabled children voluntarily enrolled in private
schools,3 ' and it helps specifically those students who cannot learn with-
out related services.
IV. CONCLUSION
The IDEA Amendments potentially undermine the statute's initial
purpose of ensuring an appropriate education to all disabled students.
Further, the circuit courts' affirmations of IDEA's restrictive private
school provisions weaken parental arguments considerably. Rather than
taking a wholly discretionary approach to voluntarily enrolled disabled
private school students' entitlements to services, courts and Congress
should adopt a limited discretion approach. While Congress' intention to
decrease public school spending is admirable, it does not consider the
most important participants in the situation-the disabled children them-
selves. In denying related services to children who require them for their
education, courts and Congress are effectively limiting these children's
rights to learn. For the sake of these children's futures, our lawmakers
must reconsider their restrictive IDEA interpretations.
discretion in their disabled children's education will encourage them to remove children
from the public system for any reason, and that defining similarly-situated students in
public and private schools in order to determine average costs proves to be impossible).
300. See Oegema, supra note 153, at 123 (noting that the limited discretion approach
affords voluntarily enrolled private school students an education suited to their needs "as
well as an equality of opportunity in their education by enabling them to choose a school
based on factors other than their disability"); cf Schwartz, supra note 50, at 807 (suggest-
ing that the approach is actually in the parents', not the students', best interests).
301. See Oegema, supra note 153, at 123.
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